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SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
WOODROWJOHNG~R~AN~T~----
Petitioner-Appellant 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent 
Honorable Robert C Naftz Dtstrict Judge 
Appealed from the District Court of the ....;S.;.;ixt.;.;.h~-­
Judtcial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
___ ...;;B...;;a_nn_o:...;c;.;.;·k ___ County. 
Molly Huskey 
State Appellate Public Defender 
Attorney _ _ .:.;X __ For Appellant X 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
--- - - -
Idaho Attorney General 
Attorney __ .:.;X __ For Respondent _X _ __ _ 
Filed this day of 
Clerk ~~~~~~~-~~~--
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW JOHN GRANT, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
) Supreme Court No. 39207-2011 
vs. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent, ) 
) 
CLERK'S RECORD 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock. 
Before HONORABLE Judge Robert C. Naftz District Judge. 
For Appellant: 
For Respondent: 
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udicial District Court ~ Bannock 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2011-0000759-PC Current Judge: Robert C Naftz 
Woodrow John Grant, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: DCANO 
Woodrow John Grant, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date 
2/13/2011 
2/14/2011 
2/23/2011 
3/4/2011 
3/17/2011 
4/4/2011 
5/5/2011 
5/11/2011 
5/13/2011 
5/27/2011 
8/11/2011 
9/21/2011 
9/22/2011 
Code 
LOCT 
NCPC 
DSBT 
CSTS 
APSC 
NOTC 
MOTN 
MOTN 
MISC 
User 
NO ELlA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
NO ELlA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
DCANO 
DCANO 
DCANO 
DCANO 
DCANO 
Judge 
SURPEME COURT APPEAL; diane Robert C Naftz 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief w/ Affidavit w I Robert C Naftz 
support: pro se 
Motion and Affidavit in support for appointment of Robert C Naftz 
counsel ; pro se 
Motion and Affidavit for permission to proceed on Robert C Naftz 
partial payment of ocurt fees (prisoner) pro se 
New Case Filed-Post Conviction Relief 
Order extending time for filing an Answer; s/ 
Judge Naftz 2-25-2011 
Notice of intent to dismiss; s/ Judge Naftz 
3-17-2011 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Petitioners Response to Courts Notice of Intent to Robert C Naftz 
dismiss; pro se 
Motion to Amend Petition for Post Conviction Robert C Naftz 
Relief: pro se 
Motion for leave to Amend Petition for Post Robert C Naftz 
Conviction Relief; pro se 
Order Dismissing Petition for Post conviction Robert C Naftz 
relief; court hereby Dismisses the Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief: s/ Judge Naftz 5-10-2011 
Dismissed Before Trial Or Hearing 
Case Status Changed: Closed 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Order Denying Motion for leave to Amend Petition Robert C Naftz 
for Post Conviction Relief; (Court DENIES the 
Moiton for leave to Amend Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief) s/ Judge Naftz 5-12-2011 
Motion to alter or amend or reconsider order Robert C Naftz 
dismissing petition for post conviction relief; pro 
se 
Order Denying motion to alter or Amend or Robert C Naftz 
reconsider Petition for Post Conviction Relief; 
(Petitioners Motion is hereby DENIED) s/ Judge 
Naftz 8-9-2011 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Robert C Naftz 
NOTICE OF APPEAL; Woodrow Grant, pro se Robert C Naftz 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR Robert C Naftz 
APPONTMENT OF COUNSEL 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION Robert C Naftz 
TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF 
COURT FEES(Prisoner) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed Robert C Naftz 
and Mailed to SC and Counsel on 9-22-11. 
Date: 1/18/2012 
Time: 02:46 PM 
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s I District Court - Bannock """"''"" User: DCANO 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2011-0000759-PC Current Judge: Robert C Naftz 
Woodrow John Grant, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Woodrow John Grant, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
9/29/2011 ORDR DCANO ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR Robert C Naftz 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL; Signed by Judge 
Naftz on 9-26-11 filed on 9-29-11. (Mailed copies 
to Counsel and SC on 10-19-11) 
9/30/2011 MISC DCA NO IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Record Due Robert C Naftz 
Date Suspended. Reason for Suspension: 
Suspended for DC Order of Fee Waiver and/or 
Appointment of Counsel. 
10/13/2011 MISC DCANO IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Certificate Robert C Naftz 
received in SC on 1 0-7-11. Carefully examine the 
Title and Cert. advise Dist. Court Clerk if any 
errors or corrections. The Title in the Cert. must 
appear on all documents filed in SC. 
MISC DCANO IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Record Due Robert C Naftz 
Date Suspended. Reason for Suspension: 
Suspended for Dist. Court Order on Fee Waiver 
and pr Appointment of Cousnel. 
10/30/2011 MISC DCANO IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Documents received Robert C Naftz 
in SC on 1 0-21-11 Order Appointing State 
Appellate Public Defender. 
11/8/2011 MISC DCANO IDAHO SURPEME COURT; Notice of Appeal Robert C Naftz 
received in SC on 9-23-11. Docket Number 
39207-2011. Clerk's Record to be filed in SC on 
12-28-11. ( 11-23-11 5 weeks prior). 
1/18/2012 MISC DCANO CLERK'S RECORD RECEIVED IN COURT Robert C Naftz 
RECORDS ON 1-18-12. 
MISC DCANO Provided a copy of Clerk's Record on Bannock Robert C Naftz 
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office Jeanne 
Hobson on 1-18-12. 
MISC DCANO CLERK'S RECORD mailed to Counsel on Robert C Naftz 
1-18-12. Due in Supreme Court on 2-16-12. 
(Mailed and faxed notice to Klondy on 1-18-12. 
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Petitioner 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF D<\t-.>" :>oc: x 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 
-----
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL 
entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in Support of Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel. 
1. Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Corrections 
under the direct care, custody and control of 
2. The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the Petitioner 
to properly pursue. Petitioner Jacks the knowledge and skill needed to represent him/herself. 
3. Petitioner/Respondent required assistance completing these pleadings, as he/she 
was unable to do it him/herself. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- 1 
Revised: I 0/13/05 
9 
4. 
DATED this _3_ day of F<-bruc;..r'7 '20Jl_. 
X LJon,)rot .. 1 G-ra...,J. 
Petitioner 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County 
and says as follows: 
I. I am the Affiant in the above-entitled case; 
2. I am currently residing at the -.L!...L£::cU..:W""--~~~_:,_~~~c:::::_~.J.;:d-ll...~-' 
under the care, custody and control of Warden V'JF· £'--y::::, u: ,:_ 
! 
3. I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire private counsel; 
4. I am without bank accounts, stocks, bonds, real estate or any other form of real 
property; 
5. I am unable to provide any other form of security; 
6. I am untrained in the law; 
7. If I am forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be unfairly 
handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the State; 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVll IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF C01JN"SEL- 2 
Rc·;ised: I OJ! 3/05 
Hl 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays that this Honorable Court issue 
Order granting Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel to represent his/her interest, 
or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may appear the Petitioner is entitled to. 
DATED This~ day of_,£'----""e-..:Jb""'r'-'v=c..=r--:;'1'--------' 20_1_( . 
X LJ Oo cJrot..J G--ra ..... }-
Petitioner 
''TV 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this 1_ day 
of F~1r u &i'y ,20_1L. 
(SEAL) 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR ~~.PPOI.!'-JTrv1ENT OF COlJl'-JSEL ~ 3 
Revised: I 0/13/05 
! ! 
, I ·"' o~,r~"· 
:,f--. f}.-Y.-)1·~-- ,. .... _ ,_) ·._,..i c- _;:, ~ :--r· ·~ \--'t~ ·-) L 
Full Name of Party Filing This Document 
\ L C-- \"'.) (--: J ;:·~ • ~3·();( /!f)('} I() 
Mailing Address (Street or Post Office Box) 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B.~fcJJ-Joc r.; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Defendant. 
L'T 
Case No.: _____ _ 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL 
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code § 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for 
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility, 
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed 
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when 
you file this document. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
A ) ss. 
County of _._\:.o.0"-";_;><. _____ ) 
[N Plaintiff ] Defendant asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court 
fees, and swears under oath 
1 . This is an action for (type of case) ---'-~""-'---'-...Jo..;'-'"-'-"--'"'-'....W..."-'-'-''--..l-.l..!~~-'---­
believe I'm entitled to get what I am as king for. 
iviOTIOi~ Ai~-o AFF-iDA \liT FOR PERiviiSSi·Ot~ TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-10C 2/25/2005 
PAGE 1 
' / 
2/G1 I have not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on 
the same operative facts in any state or federal court. [ ] I have filed this claim against the 
same party or a claim based on the same a per ative facts in a state or federal court. 
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now. I have attached to this affidavit a cur rent 
statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the 
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve ( 12) months, 
whichever is less. 
4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the 
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly 
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the 
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's 
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full. 
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false 
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen ( 14) 
years. 
Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages 
if more space is needed for any response. 
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE: 
How I ong at that address?_--"=---'---'-------- Phone:---'-~---"---1-=-r:....;_ __ 
Date and place of 
DEPENDENTS: 
I am f':xt:single [ ] married. If married, you must provide the following information: 
Nameofspouse: __________________________________________________ _ 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMiSSiON TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO HOC 2125/2005 
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My other dependents (including min or children) are: ----------------
INCOME: 
Amount of my income: x.$ __ 0,..,..~-""·,/_· _ per [ ] week yl month 
Other than my inmate account I have outside money from: __,Jc.,;;;;_~~----------
ASSETS: 
List all real property (land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you. 
Your 
Address City State 
Legal 
Description 
List all other property owned by you and state its value. 
Description (provide description for each item) 
Notes and Receivables 
Bank/Credit Union/Savings/Checking Accounts 
Stocks/Bonds/Investments/Certificates of Deposit 
Retirement Accounts/IRAs/401 (k)s 
Cash Value Insurance 
Motorcy cles/Boats/RV s/S nowmob il es: 
Furniture/ Appliances 
Jewelry/ Antiques/Coli ectibles 
~v10TION A~JD AFFIDA'JIT FOR PERJ\11SSIO~~ TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO HOC 2125/2005 
14 
Value 
' \ \\ \..')!)(' 
Equity 
Value 
PAGE 3 
Description (provide description for each item) 
Tools/Equipment 
Sporting Goods/Guns 
Horses/Livestock/Tack 
Other (describe) 
EXPENSES: List all of your monthly expenses. 
Expense 
Rent/House Payment 
Vehicle Payment(s) 
Credit Cards: (list each account number) 
Loans: (name of lender and reason for loan) 
Electricity/Natural Gas ()f 
Water/Sewer IT rash 
Auto Maintenance vs·· 
Cosmetics/Haircuts/Salons 
Entertainment/Books/Magazines 
Home Insurance 
rv10TfON A~40 AFFIDAVIT FOR PER~v11SSIO~J TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-10C 2!25/2005 
' \ l\.Jt"' \h 
Value 
Average 
Monthly Payment 
PAGE4 
Expense 
Auto Insurance 
Life Insurance 
Medical Insurance 
Medical Expense 
Other 
MISCELLANEOUS: 
6 
Average 
Monthly Payment 
How much can you borrow? $ ____ /6_-· ____ From whom?----------
When did you file your last income tax return? ____ Amount of refund: $ _____ _ 
PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided) 
Phone YeaJS Known 
'!,'"":;, /~/\ ,".~ \D 
'' 
' Typed or Printed Name 
j"~ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this day of 
20JL. 
MOTiON AND AFFiDAVIT FOR PERM!SS!ON TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-10C 2/2512005 
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otary Publi_c_:fo=r=l=d~ah=o===::;;:+=-;:==-Residing at , 
My Com miss ion expires --'11-;f-/i_t-ow...r/_./'-'3,___ 
I I 
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= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 02/09/2011 = 
Doc No: 80692 Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL 
TIER-1 CELL-S 
Transaction Dates: 02/09/2010-02/09/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
0.00 978.32 982.03 3.71 
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
08/03/2010 HQ0509116-001 
08/03/2010 HQ0509126-012 
08/05/2010 HQOS09592-010 
08/09/2010 II0510207-936 
08/09/2010 II0510207-937 
08/16/2010 II0510956-754 
08/16/2010 II0510956-755 
08/16/2010 II0511009-014 
08/23/2010 II0511745-724 
08/24/2010 HQ0511936-017 
08/25/2010 II0512197-025 
08/30/2010 II0512627-710 
08/30/2010 II0512627-711 
08/31/2010 II0512849-010 
09/03/2010 IC0513396-338 
09/23/2010 HQOS15727-018 
09/28/2010 IC0516314-557 
09/30/2010 HQ0516504-018 
10/01/2010 IC0516678-013 
10/05/2010 IC0516897-517 
10/06/2010 IC0517382-020 
10/08/2010 HQ0517870-008 
10/12/2010 IC0517927-561 
10/13/2010 IC0518343-029 
10/19/2010 IC0518919-688 
10/20/2010 HQ0519092-009 
10/29/2010 HQOS20042-014 
11/02/2010 IC0520360-526 
11/03/2010 IC0520671-012 
11/04/2010 HQ0520724-017 
11/09/2010 IC0521439-557 
11/15/2010 HQ0522095-016 
11/16/2010 IC0522179-646 
11/16/2010 IC0522304-006 
11/29/2010 HQ0523469-014 
11/30/2010 IC0523588-011 
12/07/2010 IC0524936-488 
12/10/2010 HQ0525483-003 
12/14/2010 IC0525877-493 
950-REINCARCERATED 
013-RCPT RDU 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
071-MED CO-PAY 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
100-CR INM CMM 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
071-MED CO-PAY 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
078-MET MAIL 
099-COMM SPL 
078-MET MAIL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
078-MET MAIL 
099-COMM SPL 
022-PHONE TIME 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
078-MET MAIL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
078-MET MAIL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
070-PHOTO COPY 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
17 
IBSUSPCHK 
RDU 
RTCP MO 
383325 
RTCP MO 
397008 
289942 
171930 
114549 
116152 
056586 
115978 
116547 
879315 
117188 
521575 
076807 
117143 
731067 
117142 
741214 
0.00 
1. 03 
50.00 
14.97DB 
12.13DB 
10.20DB 
5.59DB 
S.OODB 
1.86DB 
40.00 
1.86 
19.27DB 
6.80DB 
7.00DB 
lO.OODB 
340.00 
85.75DB 
100.00 
0.17DB 
78.22DB 
1. 73DB 
50.00 
22.30DB 
1.73DB 
280.23DB 
17.00DB 
25.01 
21. 48DB 
2.75DB 
20.00 
21. 79DB 
20.00 
17.88DB 
2.71DB 
50.00 
2.80DB 
36.59DB 
40.00 
36.59DB 
0.00 
1. 03 
51.03 
36.06 
23.93 
13.73 
8.14 
3.14 
1.28 
41.28 
43.14 
23.87 
17.07 
10.07 
0.07 
340.07 
254.32 
354.32 
354.15 
275.93 
274.20 
324.20 
301.90 
300.17 
19.94 
2.94 
27.95 
6.47 
3.72 
23.72 
1. 93 
21.93 
4.05 
1. 34 
51.34 
48.54 
11.95 
51.95 
15.36 
IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 02/09/2011 = 
Doc No: 80692 Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL 
TIER-1 CELL-S 
Transaction Dates: 02/09/2010-02/09/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
0.00 978.32 982.03 3.71 
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
12/14/2010 IC0525914-493 099-COMM SPL 
12/14/2010 IC0525926-670 099-COMM SPL 
12/14/2010 IC0525974-022 078-MET MAIL 
12/17/2010 HQ0526491-008 011-RCPT MO/CC 
12/20/2010 IC0526734-012 078-MET MAIL 
12/21/2010 HQ0526858-009 011-RCPT MO/CC 
12/23/2010 IC0527219-495 099-COMM SPL 
12/28/2010 HQ0527590-011 011-RCPT MO/CC 
01/04/2011 IC0528324-630 099-COMM SPL 
01/07/2011 IC0529034-029 078-MET MAIL 
01/10/2011 HQ0529142-011 011-RCPT MO/CC 
01/11/2011 IC0529332-582 099-COMM SPL 
01/18/2011 IC0529982-599 099-COMM SPL 
01/18/2011 IC0529984-027 100-CR INM CMM 
01/24/2011 IC0530741-027 078-MET MAIL 
01/25/2011 IC0530816-582 099-COMM SPL 
01/27/2011 HQ0531291-016 061-CK INMATE 
01/31/2011 IC0531529-029 078-MET MAIL 
02/01/2011 IC0531587-567 099-COMM SPL 
02/03/2011 HQ0532078-014 011-RCPT MO/CC 
02/08/2011 IC0532636-528 099-COMM SPL 
02/08/2011 HQ0532829-012 022-PHONE TIME 
122490 
845087 
121218 
843423 
182745 
127823 
640902 
132982 
K-133158 
132091 
317879 
131224 
-36.59DB 
44.21DB 
4.85DB 
20.00 
6.16DB 
50.00 
48.07DB 
50.00 
54.13DB 
1.05DB 
30.00 
6.00DB 
26.48DB 
54.13 
2.75DB 
42.29DB 
9.25DB 
2.07DB 
7.00DB 
40.00 
31.26DB 
6.80DB 
is a full, true, and 
51.95 
7.74 
2.89 
22.89 
16.73 
66.73 
18.66 
68.66 
14.53 
13.48 
43.48 
37.48 
11.00 
65.13 
62.38 
20.09 
10.84 
8.77 
1. 77 
41.77 
10.51 
3.71 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW GRANT, ) 
} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-11-759-PC 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME 
FOR FILING AN ANSWER 
_________________________________ ) 
Based on Respondent State of Idaho's motion filed herein and good cause 
appearing, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Respondent is granted an extension of time 
for filing an Answer in this matter. Said Answer shall be filed by '3 /a.S /II 
DATED this~~ day of February, 2011 ,. 
~c.~ 
ROBERT C. NAFTZ 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 
true and correct copy of the ORDER TO EXTEND TIME FOR FILING AN ANSWER 
upon each of the following individuals in the manner indicat1 
WOODROW GRANT #80692 £1 mail -
ICC- W postage prepaid 
P 0 BOX 70010 [] hand delivery 
BOISE ID 83707 []facsimile 
JARED W. JOHNSON 
DEPUTY PROSECUTOR 
[ ] mail-
BANNOCK COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
POCATELLO ID 83201 
p6stage prepaid [ 1 hand delivery 
[ ] facsimile 
DALE HATCH, Clerk of the Court 
By: ___________ _ 
Deputy Clerk 
20 
MARK L. HIEDEMAN 
BANNOCK COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
P.O. Box P 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-0050 
(208) 236-7280 
JARED W. JOHNSON, ISB #7812 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW GRANT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
____________________________ ) 
CASE NO. CV-11-759-PC 
MOTION TO EXTEND TIME 
FOR FILING AN ANSWER 
COMES NOW, the Respondent State of Idaho by and through JARED W. 
JOHNSON, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby moves this court for a 30 day 
extension of time for filing an Answer in this matter. 
This motion is based on the Respondent not having received the necessary 
Affidavit from Petitioner's former Defense Attorney. 
DATED this~ day of February, 2011, 
J 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this Z Y day of February, 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR FILING AN ANSWER 
was delivered to the following: 
WOODROW GRANT #80692 
ICC-W 
P 0 BOX 70010 
BOISE 10 83707 
Hmail-
r postage prepaid 
[ ] hand delivery 
[ ] facsimile 
.. ' 
' f' ... 
··&J 
. ' . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TlfE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW GRANT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
NOTICE OF INTENT 
TO DISMISS 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case comes before this Court on a pro-se Petition for Post Conviction Relief, a 
Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel, and a Motion and Affidavit for 
Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees filed by Woodrow Grant ("the 
Petitioner" or "Mr. Grant"). The State did not respond. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Grant pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine 
and domestic assault and was subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The Petitioner 
previously filed a Rule 35 Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, as well as an appeal 
of the denial of that motion. (See Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief w/ Aff. in Supp. ("Pet. for 
Post-Conviction Relief'), Feb. 14, 2011, 2.) 
This Court is fully briefed in the Petitioner's allegations and the law. Furthermore, this 
Court has carefully reviewed the Petition for Post Conviction Relief and the accompanying 
motions and affidavits. Based upon the following discussion, this Court hereby gives the 
Petitioner notice of its intent to dismiss the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
23 
ISSUES 
1. Whether to grant the Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 
2. Whether to grant the Motion for Partial Payment of Court Fees. 
3. Whether to grant the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
DISCUSSION 
In support of his Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Mr. Grant first argues he received 
the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner also alleges relief is warranted on the basis 
that "[t]here is evidence and material facts not previously presented or heard." (Id.) Mr. Grant 
further argues post conviction relief is appropriate because his "[g]uilty plea was not 
knowingly/voluntarily entered as Petitioner is mentally incompetent due to being bi-polar." (/d.) 
Finally, the Petitioner alleges the "[s]entence imposed is cruel and unusual as it is excessive in 
respect to the facts of the case. This violates both the U.S. Constitutional & [sic] Idaho 
Constitution [sic] Rights of the Plaintiff." (/d.) However, with the exception of some additional 
arguments in support of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Petitioner failed to 
support the other allegations with argument or evidence. Mr. Grant did not point this Court to 
the underlying record or any transcripts of proceedings. 
1. Whether to grant the Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 
a. Standard of Review 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
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A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction proceeding is governed by 
Idaho Code ("IC") § 19-49041, which provides that a court-appointed attorney may be made 
available to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation. Charboneau v. State, 
140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). The decision to grant or deny a request for 
court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. ld. (citing Fox v. State, 
129 Idaho 881, 934 P .2d 94 7 (Idaho Ct.App. 1997) ). When a district court is presented with a 
request for appointed counsel, the court will address that request before ruling on the substantive 
issues in the case. ld. 
Under IC § 19-4904, the court "should determine if the petitioner is able to afford counsel 
and whether this is a situation in which counsel should be appointed to assist the petitioner." Jd. 
at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. In making this analysis, the court considers the typical problems with 
pro se pleadings, such as the fact that these types of pleadings are often conclusory and 
incomplete and that facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because the pro se 
petitioner does not know what they may be. ld. (citing Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d 
138 (2001)). However, the court must examine the record to determine "whether the facts are 
such that they justify the appointment of counsel." ld. at 794, 102 P.3d at 1113. In doing so, 
every inference must run in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented and 
1 § 19-4904. Inability to pay costs. 
If the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of representation, including stenographic, printing, witness 
fees and expenses, and legal services, these costs and expenses, and a court-appointed attorney may be made 
available to the applicant in the preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal, and paid, on order of 
the district court, by the county in which the application is filed. 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
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cannot be expected to know how to allege the necessary facts. ld. At a minimum, the court 
"must carefully consider the request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the substantive 
merits of the petition." ld. 
If, after examining a petitioner's claims, the court determines that such claims are 
frivolous, "it is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of the claimed defects so he 
has an opportunity to respond." Id. at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. If the petitioner alleges facts that 
raise the possibility of a valid claim, the court should appoint counsel in order to give the 
petitioner an opportunity, working with counsel, to properly allege the necessary supporting 
facts. ld; see also, Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Idaho Ct.App. 2004) 
(Although the petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the record for 
possible nonfrivolous claims, he should be provided with a meaningful opportunity to 
supplement the record and to renew his request for court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal 
of his petition where he has alleged facts supporting some elements of a valid claim.). The court 
"should provide sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to 
supplement the request with the necessary additional facts, if they exist." !d. 
"[A] district court presented with a request for appointed counsel in a post-conviction 
action must address that request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case and errs if it 
denies a petition on the merits before ruling on the applicant's request for counsel." Judd v. 
State, 148 Idaho 22, 218 P.3d 1, 2 (Idaho Ct.App. 2009). However, 
an order that simultaneously dismisses a post-conviction action and denies a motion for 
appointment of counsel will be upheld on appeal if the petitioner received notice of the 
fatal deficiencies of the petition and if, when the standard governing a motion for 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss 4 
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
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appointment of counsel is correctly applied, the request for counsel would properly be 
denied - that is, when the petitioner did not allege facts raising even the possibility of a 
valid claim. 
!d. at 4. A determination regarding a request for the appointment of counsel and a determination 
regarding whether a petition for post conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal are thus 
governed by "quite different standards, with the threshold showing that is necessary in order to 
gain appointment of counsel being considerably lower than that which is necessary to avoid 
summary dismissal of a petition." !d. 
b. Analysis 
This Court must examine the petition to determine whether the facts alleged justifY the 
appointment of counsel. If such facts appear to this Court to be frivolous, or the situation 
presented does not appear to be one in which counsel should be appointed to assist the Petitioner, 
this Court may deny the request for counsel. 
Based on the following findings, this Court hereby DENIES the Petitioner's Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel, as the allegations made by the Petitioner are frivolous for the reasons 
stated herein. Furthermore, this Court finds the Petitioner did not allege facts raising even the 
possibility of a valid claim. Therefore, the appointment of counsel is not required. 
2. Whether to grant the Motion for Partial Payment of Court Fees. 
This Court must also determine whether the Petitioner's Motion to Proceed on Partial 
Payment of Court Fees should be granted. Along with that motion, the Petitioner submitted an 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
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affidavit certifying he is unable to pay all the court costs now. Idaho Appellate Rule ("IAR") 232 
governs the waiver of appellate filing fees. According to subsections one (1) and ten (10) of that 
rule, there is no filing fee required for petitions for post conviction relief. Even so, after having 
carefully reviewed Mr. Grant's request and the accompanying affidavit, this Court concludes the 
Petitioner is unable to afford whatever costs might be required for proceeding with his Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief. Therefore, the fee waiver request is GRANTED. 
3. Whether to grant the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
a. Standard of Review 
A petition for post conviction relief is governed by the Uniform Post Conviction 
Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), IC §§ 19-4901- 19-4911. Such a petition initiates a proceeding that 
is civil in nature. State v. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho 76, 79, 57 P.3d 787, 790 (2002); State v. 
LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 806, 69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Idaho Ct.App. 2003). Under IC § 19-4901(a), 
a person who is convicted of or sentenced for a crime may institute a proceeding to secure relief 
based on a claim that the conviction was in violation of the state or federal constitutions or the 
laws of Idaho, or that "there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and 
2 Rule 23. Filing fees and clerk's certificate of appeal--Waiver of appellate filing fee 
(a) Filing Fees. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall charge the following filing fees for appeals and petitions: 
(1) Appeals in civil cases except for habeas corpus and post-conviction relief 
$ 86.00 
(1 0) Petitions for post-conviction relief 
$None 
No appellate filing fee is required for agencies of the State ofldaho and Counties of the State ofidaho, including 
public defenders, pursuant to l.C. § 67-2301 and l.C. § 31-3212(2). 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
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6 
heard, that requires the vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interests of justice," among 
other grounds. 
Pursuant to IC § 19-4901 (b), a petition for post conviction relief is not a substitute for 
appeaL A petitioner is not allowed to raise any issue that could have been raised on a direct 
appeal, but was not so raised, unless those issues were not known and could not have reasonably 
been known at the time of the appeal. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 603, 21 P.3d 924, 
925 (2001). Similarly, a post conviction petitioner may notre-litigate the same issues that were 
already presented in a direct appeal. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho at 81, 57 P.3d at 792. 
IC § 19-4902(a)3 establishes the time limits for the filing of a petition for post conviction 
relief, requiring that "[a]n application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the 
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." That section of the code 
also requires that "[f]acts within the personal knowledge of the applicant and the authenticity of 
all documents and exhibits included in or attached to the application must be sworn to 
affirmatively as true and correct." 
3 19-4902. Commencement of proceedings--Verification--Filing--Service--DNA testing 
(a) A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the district court 
in which the conviction took place. An application may be filed at any time within one (I) year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an 
appeal, whichever is later. Facts within the personal knowledge ofthe applicant and the authenticity of all 
documents and exhibits included in or attached to the application must be sworn to affmnatively as true and correct. 
The supreme court may prescribe the form of the application and verification. The clerk shall docket the application 
upon its receipt and promptly bring it to the attention of the court and deliver a copy to the prosecuting attorney. 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
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IC § 19-49034 further demands that a petitioner state and identify in the application for 
post conviction relief the grounds upon which the application is based, the specific relief 
requested, all previous proceedings in the case and the facts that are within the personal 
knowledge of the petitioner. That section also requires that a petitioner attach affidavits, records 
and other evidence supporting the allegations, or recite why such evidence is not attached to the 
application. IC § 19-4903 has been interpreted to require that an application "must present or be 
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application shall be 
subject to dismissal," i.e., the application must contain more facts than the "short and plain 
statement of the claim" that is required ofthe usual civil complaint by Rule 8(a)(l) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP"). Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271-72,61 P.2d 626,628-
29 (Idaho Ct.App. 2003). 
IC § 19-4906(b) permits a court to dismiss the action if the court is satisfied, based on the 
record, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by any further 
proceedings. That section also requires that the court, as a prerequisite to dismissal, give the 
petitioner notice of intent to dismiss and provide twenty days during which the petitioner may 
4 § 19-4903. Application--Contents 
The application shall identifY the proceedings in which the applicant was convicted, give the date of the entry of the 
judgment and sentence complained of, specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based, and 
clearly state the relief desired. Facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant shall be set forth separately from 
other allegations offacts and shall be verified as provided in section 19-4902. Affidavits, records, or other evidence 
supporting its allegations shall be attached to the application or the application shall recite why they are not attached. 
The application shall identifY all previous proceedings, together with the grounds therein asserted, taken by the 
applicant to secure relief from his conviction or sentence. Argument, citations, and discussion of authorities are 
unnecessary. 
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respond. However, under IC § 19-4906(c)5 the court may summarily dispose ofthe petition 
upon the motion of either of the parties when, based on the record, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No notice of intent 
to dismiss is required for a summary disposition under that section. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 
Idaho 319,321-22,900 P.2d 795,797-98 (1995). Summary dismissal under either section is the 
procedural equivalent of a motion for summary judgment. Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 
P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 898 (Ct.App. 1994). Thus, 
in determining whether to summarily dismiss, a court must view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the petitioner and determine whether those facts would entitle the petitioner to relief 
if accepted as true. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d 110, 111 (2001); Goodwin, 138 
Idaho at 272, 61 P.2d at 629; LePage, 138 Idaho at 806, 69 P.3d at 1067. If the court finds that 
the accepted facts entitle the petitioner to relief, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. 
LePage, 138 Idaho at 806-07, 69 P.3d at 1067-68. 
Summary dismissal of an application may be appropriate, even if the State does not 
controvert the petitioner's facts, because "the court is not required to accept either the applicant's 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions 
oflaw." Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.2d at 629; LePage, 138 Idaho at 807, 69 P.3d at 1068. 
Further, a petition is "subject to summary dismissal if the petitioner has not presented evidence 
5 IC § 19-4906(c). The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the application when it 
appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together 
with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw. 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
9 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears 
the burden of proof." Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 604, 21 P.2d at 926. 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no 
genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary 
hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 
(Ct.App.l991); Hoover v. State. 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458,459 (Ct.App.1988); 
Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct.App.1987). Summary 
dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even 
where the state does not controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not 
required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by 
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 
644, 647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct.App.l994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 
P.2d 369,372 (Ct.App.l986). 
Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 667-68, 152 P.3d 25, 28-29 (Idaho Ct.App. 2007). The 
court in that case further explained the procedure for summary dismissal when the state has not 
provided notice of the grounds for dismissal. 
[I]f the state's motion fails to give notice of the grounds, the court may grant summary 
dismissal only if the court first gives the applicant twenty days' notice of intent to dismiss 
and the grounds therefore, pursuant to Section 19-4906(b). Flores v. State, 128 Idaho 
476, 478, 915 P.2d 38, 40 (Ct.App.l996). This procedure is necessary so that the 
applicant is afforded an opportunity to respond and to establish a material issue of fact. 
!d. 
!d. at 668, 152 P.3d at 29. "On appeal from a summary disposition, [the Court of Appeals] 
exercises free review. Yon v. State, 124 Idaho 821, 822, 864 P.2d 659,660 (Ct.App.1993); 
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct.App.1988)." Abbott v. State, 129 
Idaho 381,382,924 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Idaho Ct.App. 1996). 
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DISCUSSION 
As explained previously, the bulk of Mr. Grant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
concerns the alleged failure of his counsel to adequately represent him. The Petitioner set forth 
12 grounds in support of that claim. However, Mr. Grant failed to elaborate on or offer support 
in the form of argument or additional evidence as to the other grounds raised in support of post 
conviction relief. Therefore, this Court will only address in detail the Petitioner's contentions 
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court will review those claims in tum. 
a. Standard of Review Governing a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
"In order to establish a violation of the constitutional guarantee to effective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice." Beasley 
v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 359, 883 P.2d 714, 717 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994) (internal citations 
omitted). The test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received the effective 
assistance of counsel is two-pronged and requires that the petitioner establish: ( 1) counsel's 
conduct was deficient because it fell outside the wide range of professional norms; and (2) the 
petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the deficient conduct. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 
6 P .3d 831, 834 (2000); Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 982 P .2d 931, 936 ( 1999) (citing 
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 S.Ct. 2052,2064 (1984)). "Facts presented 
must be in the form of competent, admissible evidence. Bare assertions and speculation, 
unsupported by specific facts, do not suffice to show ineffectiveness of counsel." Roman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898,903 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994)(intemal citations omitted). 
In assessing the reasonableness of attorney performance, counsel is presumed to have 
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rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834; State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300, 
306-07, 986 P.2d 323, 329-30 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Strategic and tactical 
decisions will not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post conviction relief under a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review. 
Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834; Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 
(1994), cert denied 513 U.S. 1130 (1995). To satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, 
the applicant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Milburn v. 
State, 135 Idaho 701, 706, 23 P.3d 775, 780 (Idaho Ct.App. 2000)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694); Fox v. State, 125 Idaho 672,674, 873 P.2d 926,928 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994). The applicant 
must show that the attorney's deficient conduct 'so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.' Milburn, 
135 Idaho at 706,23 P.3d at 780 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). The applicant must show 
actual unreasonable performance by trial counsel and actual prejudice. /d. "Hence, dismissal is 
proper if the applicant fails to meet his burden under either part." Fox, 125 Idaho at 674, 873 
P.2d at 928; Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903 ("To avoid summary dismissal, a post-
conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must sufficiently allege facts under both 
prongs of the test."). 
b. Analysis 
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1. Change ofvenue 
The Petitioner first argues his counsel was ineffective because he "refused to attempt a 
change of venue even when counsel was informed that the victim's mother was a secretary of the 
local police chief." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Reliefw/ Aff. in Supp. ("Pet. for Post-Conviction 
Relief'), Feb. 14, 2011, 2.) In further support of that argument, the Petitioner stated the 
following in his affidavit: "The victim has a history of self-abuse and has threatened to blame 
me for injuries that were self-inflicted. The victim's behavioral problems and brushes with the 
law have been covered up and concealed by her mother who is the secretary for the local chief of 
police." (Aff. in Supp., Feb. 14,2011, 5:5-6.) 
"The reasons for a change of venue, as set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 2l(a) and 2l(b)6, 
are that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the case is pending or that the 
convenience of the parties and the witnesses would best be served by a change of the venue." 
State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 170, 175, 857 P.2d 649, 654 (Idaho Ct.App. 1993). "[T]he issue of 
whether a change of venue should be requested is a matter of trial strategy and tactical choice, 
not subject to review as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the absence of proof of 
inadequate preparation or ignorance on counsel's part. State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 923, 655 
P.2d 434,440 (1982)." ld. 
6 Rule 21. Change of venue 
(a) For Prejudice. The court upon motion of either party shall transfer the proceeding to another county if the court 
is satisfied that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the case is pending. 
(b) Other Cases. For the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, the court upon motion 
of the defendant may transfer the proceedings as to the defendant to another county. 
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In this case, there is nothing in the record to establish the basis for a change of venue, 
even if such a request had been made. As such, the failure of the Petitioner's counsel to move for 
a change of venue did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel since that decision was 
clearly a matter of trial strategy and tactical choice. 
2. Counsel refused to request a "change of Judges" 
The Petitioner next argues his counsel was ineffective because he "refused to request a 
change of judges and did not request Judge Naftz recuse [sic] himself when counsel was 
informed that Judge Naftz had been an attorney representing the Petitioner's brother at an earlier 
date and due to the circumstances surrounding that previous case might be biased." (Pet. for 
Post-Conviction Relief at 2-3.) In his "Affidavit in Support", Mr. Grant further states: "I feel 
that the sentencing judge was unduly biased against me as he had represented my brother as his 
attorney at an earlier date." (Aff. in Supp. at 6:8.) However, the Petitioner offered no support 
for those bare allegations and does not allege any specific points of error that might reveal the 
district court's bias. "Furthermore, the decision whether to request the recusal of a trial judge is 
a strategic matter, one which should be left to the discretion of the attorney. See Giles v. State, 
125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994)." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 333, 971 P.2d 
1151, 1157 (Idaho Ct.App. 1999). As such, the failure of the Petitioner's counsel to request the 
recusal of the trial judge did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
3. Counsel did not pursue the option of Mental Health Court 
Mr. Grant next argues: "Counsel was fully aware of Petitioner's mental health issues and 
did not actively pursue the option of the Mental Health Court." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief 
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at 3.) The Petitioner does not offer any admissible evidence in support of this contention. Mr. 
Grant re-stated this allegation in his Affidavit, however, he attached no documentation to verify 
this claim, nor did he submit records or other evidence. (See Aff. in Supp. at 6:12.) Therefore, 
as this is only a bare and conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, Mr. 
Grant has not proven this allegation by a preponderance of the evidence as required by the 
statutes governing post conviction proceedings. This "court is not required to accept either the 
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions oflaw." Downingv. State, 132 Idaho 861,861,979 P.2d 1219, 1219 (Idaho Ct.App. 
1999) (internal citations omitted). As the application did not present adequate evidence 
supporting this allegation, Mr. Grant has not shown his counsel was ineffective because he failed 
to "actively pursue the option of the Mental Health Court." 
4. Counsel was ineffective for failing to protect the Petitioner's interests 
during the "psych-evaluation" 
Mr. Grant next claims his counsel was ineffective because he 
failed to advise, attend, or protect client's interests during the psych-evaluation. Nor did 
he advise the Petitioner that the Petitioner was not obligated to provide information that 
would be used against him. This is ineffective assistance of counsel under the Estrada 
case and thus violates the Petitioner's U.S. Constitutional and Idaho Constitutional 
Rights. 
(Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 3.) In his Affidavit in Support, the Petitioner merely 
reiterated these same allegations. (See Aff. in Supp. at 6:13-15.) 
Mr. Grant appears to argue his counsel failed to advise him of his rights regarding some 
type of psychological evaluation. However, beyond his use of the term "psych-evaluation", Mr. 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
15 
37 
Grant does not explain what type of evaluation was conducted. He references the case of 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), which pertains to the rights afforded to 
defendants in relation to psychosexual evaluations. As the Petitioner did not request the review 
of the underlying criminal record, this Court cannot examine any evaluations or even determine 
what type of"psych-evaluation", if any, occurred here. If the report at issue is a psychosexual 
evaluation, certain Fifth Amendment rights would attach, as concluded by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Estrada. However, without any information regarding the type of report at issue, this 
Court is unable to evaluate this claim further. Moreover, Mr. Grant has presented no admissible 
evidence to show how his alleged participation in any evaluation implicates his counsel in this 
case. As such, this is another unsubstantiated claim, which can provide no relief under the 
Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. 
5. Failure of counsel to submit mitigating evidence 
Mr. Grant further argues his counsel was ineffective because he "failed to provide the 
sentencing court with mitigating evidence and evidence conflicting the victim's allegations 
despite such evidence being available." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 3.) Mr. Grant offered 
nothing more than that statement. In his Affidavit in Support, he merely stated: "There was 
mitigating evidence which my attorney failed to bring up which I feel would have been 
beneficial." (Aff. in Supp. at 6:16.) There was nothing submitted to this Court that identified 
any mitigating evidence that might have changed the outcome of these proceedings. See State v. 
Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 97, 967 P.2d 702, 711 (1998)(Because the petitioner failed to submit 
anything to the court that "identifie[ d] any mitigating evidence that might have changed the 
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outcome of these proceedings", the petitioner failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel.). 
Therefore, as these contentions amount to bare and conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by 
any admissible evidence, Mr. Grant has failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel as to this 
claim. 
6. Failure of counsel to offer evidence disputing the victim's allegations 
and failure to show the victim's mother acted inappropriately 
The Petitioner next argues post conviction relief is warranted because: "Counsel failed to 
show that victim's mother used her position as secretary to the local Chief of Police to 
manipulate the system in such a way as to paint the victim as an innocent [with] no criminal 
tendencies." (Pet. for Post-conviction Relief at 3.) Again, Mr. Grant offers nothing more than 
this statement and a nearly identical statement included in his supporting affidavit. (See Aff. in 
Supp. at 6:17.) He does not point this Court to any evidence to verify these allegations, or even 
detail how the victim's mother "used her position to manipulate the system .... " As such, Mr. 
Grant has not proven this allegation by a preponderance of the evidence as required by the 
statutes governing post conviction proceedings, as explained previously. Therefore, Mr. Grant 
has not shown his counsel was ineffective because he allegedly failed to provide information 
regarding the victim's claims or because he failed to demonstrate that the victim's mother acted 
inappropriately. 
7. Counsel did not explain the Petitioner's appeal rights 
Mr. Grant's next argument states in full: 
Counsel did not adequately explain the appeal process to the Petitioner and did not realize 
that, due to his mental health issues, the Petitioner was unable to make an informed 
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decision as to whether to pursue his appeal options. This caused the Petitioner to lose his 
chance at appealing the sentence and possibly receiving a lesser sentence. 
(Pet. for Post-conviction Relief at 3.) In his supporting affidavit, Mr. Grant also stated: 
"Counsel did not explain the appeal process adequately nor did he take into account the deep 
depression which causes apathy and feelings of hopelessness. Because of this I lost my appeal 
rights and by time [sic] my mental state stablized [sic] it was too late to pursue them." (Aff. in 
Supp. at 6:18-19.) 
Again, Mr. Grant has failed to adequately support this claim. The Petitioner has not 
produced facts sufficient to state a claim that entitles him to relief. Even assuming counsel failed 
to adequately advise the Petitioner as to the appeal process and that this amounted to the 
deficient performance of counsel required under the first part of the Strickland test, Mr. Grant 
has nonetheless failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from such conduct, which is 
required by the second part of that test. In the absence of a showing of prejudice, the Petitioner's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard must also fail. See Martinez v. State, 125 
Idaho 844, 847, 875 P.2d 941,944 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994). 
8. Counsel failed to protect the Petitioner's interests during the Pre-
Sentence Investigation 
Mr. Grant also argues post conviction relief is warranted on the basis that "[c]ounsel 
failed to advise, attend, or protect client's interests during the Pre-Sentence Investigation 
(P.S.I.)." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 3.) Mr. Grant goes on to state: 
The interview was conducted by a biased party and the information garnered was used 
adversely against the Petitioner. At no time did counsel inform Petitioner that he was not 
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obligated to provide information to be used against him and said rights were gauranteed 
[sic] by the US and Idaho Constitution. 
(ld. at 3-4.) In his affidavit, the Petitioner further stated: "Counsel did not explain the P.S.I. 
process to me nor did he attend the interview or provide counsel during the interview. 
Information obtained during this process was used against me." (Aff. in Supp. at 6:20.) 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has determined that counsel cannot provide ineffective 
assistance by failing to advise a client concerning his presentence investigation since a 
presentence interview is "not a critical stage of the adversarial proceedings .... " Stuart v. State, 
145 Idaho 467,471, 180 P.3d 506,510 (Idaho Ct.App. 2008). '"[I]fthe stage is not critical, 
there can be no constitutional violation, no matter how deficient counsel's performance.' United 
States v. Ben/ian, 63 F.3d 824,827 (9th Cir.l995); see Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 149 P.3d at 
837." Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448,452,224 P.3d 515, 519 (Idaho Ct.App. 2010.) 
Furthermore, the defendant bears the burden of objecting to a PSI at the time of sentencing. 
Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428, 788 P .2d 243 (Idaho Ct.App. 1990). 
Thus, in light of the above holdings, the Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance in 
relation to the presentence investigation must fail. The Petitioner further failed to offer any 
admissible evidence in support of this contention. Therefore, as this is only a bare and 
conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, Mr. Grant has not proven this 
allegation by a preponderance of the evidence as required by the statutes governing post 
conviction proceedings. 
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9. Counsel should have recognized and accounted for the Petitioner's 
mental health issues 
Mr. Grant argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to recognize the Petitioner's 
mental health issues and addictive behaviors. Mr. Grant stated: "Since counsel was aware of the 
Petitioner's mental health issues and addictive behaviors, the attorney should have been 
cognizant of the Petitioner's bi-polar mood swings and recognized depression driven behaviors 
such as giving up and not appealing the sentence and conviction." (Pet. for Post-Conviction 
Relief at 4.) In his Affidavit in Support, Mr. Grant made additional arguments: 
During the proceedings I was going through bi-polar mood swings aggravated by 
the fact that I was refusing meds from the jail so that I could try to concentrate on my 
case and what was occuring [sic]. 
Since counsel was representing someone with mental health issues and since bi-
polarism [sic] is a well documented illness, counsel should have been cognizant of my 
special needs. He was not. 
(Aff. in Supp. at 6:4, 21.) 
Although it is not completely clear, it appears to this Court that Mr. Grant is alleging his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that the Petitioner was not mentally competent at 
the time he entered his plea. See IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 18-210 (2010)("No person who as a result 
of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist 
in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an 
offense so long as such incapacity endures.") "The standard to determine competency to stand 
trial is whether the defendant has 'the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and (2) 
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assist in his defense."' Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,678,227 P.3d 925, 932(2010)(quoting 
Dusky v. US., 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)). 
In order to find that petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for refusing to request a ... 
hearing on petitioner's competency to stand trial, petitioner must show that counsel was 
deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of petitioner's proceedings. In 
[Jeter. 417 S.E.2d at 596], this Court proclaimed that in proving Strickland prejudice 
within the context of counsel's failure to fully investigate the petitioner's mental 
capacity, "the [petitioner] need only show a 'reasonable probability' that he was ... 
incompetent at the time of the plea." 
!d. Thus, in a post conviction relief action, the petitioner has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent when he entered his guilty plea. 
Jd.(intemal citations omitted). 
In this case, Mr. Grant has not provided admissible evidence showing that there is a 
reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the time he entered his plea. Mr. Grant offered 
nothing more than his own allegations that he was suffering from "bi-polar mood swings" and 
affected by "depression driven behaviors, such as giving up and not appealing the sentence and 
conviction." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 4.) The Petitioner's own conclusory and bare 
assertions alone are not sufficient to survive summary dismissal. Mr. Grant's affidavit offers 
nothing more than a mere conclusion that he was not competent to understand the nature of the 
proceedings and knowingly enter into a guilty plea, and is also unsupported by any facts as to his 
alleged mental incompetency. Without something in the record suggesting that an examination 
would have shown that Mr. Grant was incompetent, there is nothing to satisfY the prejudice 
prong of Strickland, and this claim must also fail. 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
43 
21 
10. Counsel made false assurances regarding the plea agreement and 
possible sentence 
The Petitioner next argues his "attorney made false assurances of what the plea bargin 
[sic] would accomplish and what kind of sentence the Plaintiff could expect. The attorney also 
related these assurances to the Petitioner's family." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 4.) In his 
affidavit, Mr. Grant states that his attorney led him to believe he would be placed in the "rider" 
program. (Aff. in Supp., Feb. 9, 2011, 5:3.) He further alleged: "Counsel told both me and my 
parents that a rider was the likely result of my accepting a plea bargin [sic]." (/d. at 7:22.) 
Finally, Mr. Grant stated: "Counsel did not give me a realistic appreciation of what I could 
reasonably expect during sentencing." (/d. at 7:24.) 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has given the following pertinent explanation regarding 
counsel's role in the plea process: 
Where, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea 
upon the advice of counsel, ''the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's 
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 
Griffith v. State. 121 Idaho 371, 373, 825 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct.App.1992). See also Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Soto. 121 
Idaho 53, 55, 822 P.2d 572, 574 (Ct.App.1991). When it is asserted that a guilty plea was 
the product of ineffective assistance, to prove the prejudice prong the defendant must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill. 474 U.S. at 59, 
106 S.Ct. 366; Dunlap v. State. 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376,385 (2004). 
Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 884, 187 P.3d 1253, 1259 (Idaho Ct.App. 2008.) 
Mr. Grant does not explain the alleged "false assurances" made by his counsel. 
Furthermore, he does not point to the record or offer any other evidence regarding this 
contention. As such, the Petitioner has utterly failed to prove the prejudice prong, as he has not 
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shown or even argued "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he ... 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. As such, his claim 
of ineffective assistance in this regard cannot stand. 
11. The Petitioner's efforts to fire his court-appointed attorney failed 
Mr. Grant next alleges he "attempted to rid himself of the court-appointed public 
defender and get someone else assigned who had the Petitioner's best interests in mind." (Pet. 
for Post-Conviction Relief at 4.) Mr. Grant further stated the following in his affidavit: "I 
attempted to change counsel but was not allowed to." (Aff. in Supp. at 7:23.) 
Through these allegations, the Petitioner makes absolutely no claim that his counsel was 
deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency. Mr. Grant further offered no 
documentation regarding his attempts to fire his court-appointed attorney. Therefore, as this 
contention is not even oriented toward a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and is 
unsupported by the required evidence, it cannot stand. 
12. Counsel failed to call certain witnesses 
The Petitioner argues his counsel was inadequate by failing to "bring up the testimony of 
the witnesses who supported the Petitioner's side nor did counsel have the private investigators 
findings brought up during the sentencing phase." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 4.) Mr. 
Grant offered nothing more in support of this allegation. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has set forth the following succinct explanation regarding the 
decision to call witnesses: 
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It is well settled that the decision whether to call a particular witness is a strategic or 
tactical decision which will not be second-guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction 
relief under an alleged claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that decision is 
shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 775 
P.2d 1243 (Ct.App.l989); see also State v. !vfcKenney, 101 Idaho 149, 609 P.2d 1140 
(1980), citing State v. Tucker. 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975). 
Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254,258, 869 P.2d 571, 575 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994). 
The petition submitted by Mr. Grant does not provide any basis for an objective 
evaluation regarding his counsel's decision whether to call witnesses. Once again, the Petitioner 
has submitted a conclusory statement and presented no facts to give rise to a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether his counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of professional 
norms. Furthermore, the decision whether to call a particular witness is a strategic or tactical 
decision. Therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance in this regard also fails. 
13. The Petitioner did not adequately support his claims of ineffective 
assistance 
Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, Mr. Grant failed to show how his counsel's 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 
I 04 S.Ct. 2052. First, Mr. Grant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance fell outside 
the wide range of professional norms, as he offered nothing more than conclusory statements. 
Mr. Grant did not support his allegations of ineffective assistance with documentation or make 
any argument regarding how he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient conduct. Secondly, 
even accepting the Petitioner's claim that his counsel was inadequate, the Petitioner still failed to 
demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no specific facts and made no argument that the outcome of 
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his case would have been different but for his attorney's unprofessional errors. Therefore, Mr. 
Grant's allegation that his counsel was ineffective is no more than a conclusory allegation. 
"Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not suffice to show 
ineffectiveness of counsel." Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. As such, the Petitioner's 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit, and his Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief cannot be granted on that basis. 
c. The Petitioner failed to support any of his claims with sufficient evidence 
The applicant in a post conviction proceeding must prove the allegations upon which the 
request for relief is based by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, an application for post 
conviction relief must include evidence supporting its allegation, or the application must state 
why such supporting evidence is not included. This "court is not required to accept either the 
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions oflaw." Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 861,979 P.2d 1219, 1219 (Idaho Ct.App. 
1999) (internal citations omitted). 
Mr. Grant has only offered bare and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by any 
admissible evidence. For example, this Court determined Mr. Grant did not satisfy his burden of 
proof regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Likewise, as he offered nothing 
more than short, conclusory statements regarding his additional grounds for post conviction 
relief, he has not proven those allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, either. An 
application for post conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal 
knowledge of the applicant and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations 
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must be attached or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with 
the application. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4903 (20 1 0). The application in this case did not 
present adequate evidence supporting any of the Petitioner's allegations. Therefore, as Mr. Grant 
has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the Petitioner's favor, would 
entitle him to the requested relief, summary dismissal of the Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
is warranted. As such, in accordance with Idaho Code § 19-4906, and having given the 
Petitioner adequate notice of the claimed defects contained in his Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief, this Court hereby indicates its intention to summarily dismiss Mr. Grant's petition. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court DENIES the Petitioner's request for the appointment of counsel because this 
Court finds the Petitioner's claims are without merit. The Court hereby GRANTS the Petitioner's 
Motion for Fee Waiver. 
Based on the foregoing and in accordance with Idaho Code § 19-4906, this Court hereby 
indicates its intention to dismiss the Petitioner's request for post conviction relief. The Petitioner 
must submit a suitable reply, appropriately addressing his arguments in support of post 
conviction relief, as well as satisfactorily indicating the reasons he is entitled to such relief, 
within twenty (20) days from the date of the entry of this Notice of Intent to Dismiss. If, after 
submitting additional information, the Petitioner alleges facts sufficient to raise the possibility of 
a valid claim, rather than bare, conclusory allegations, this Court will again consider whether the 
claims merit an evidentiary hearing. However, if the Petitioner fails to reply within the allotted 
time frame, this matter will be dismissed without further action of this Court. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this tl_ day ofMarch, 2011. 
Copies to: 
Mark L. Hiedeman 
Woodrow Grant, IDOC No. 80692 
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WOODROW J. GRANT 
80692, ISCI / 15A-20B 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Petitioner 
:;-, 
ln. ,_ v• i J.o tJ 
IN THE DISTRICT COU~T OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW J. GRANT, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
oOo 
) 
) Case No. CV 2011-759-PC 
) 
) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION 
) FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
) 
) 
) 
) 
____________________________ ) 
COMES NOW, WOODROW J. GRANT, Petitioner prose, in the above-captioned cause, 
who pursuant to Rule 15, of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks leave to 
amend the current Petition for Post-Conviction ~elief that is presently before this 
District Court for its consideration based upon the foregoing reasons. 
HISTORY OF ACTION 
Petitioner filed before this Court a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief with a Affidavit In Support via "Mail Box Rule" on February 9, 2011. This 
Court upon receiving said petition conducted an initial review of the Petition and 
pursuant to I.C. 19-4906(b) issued a Sua Sponte Notice of Intent to Dismiss the 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
Petitioner then on March 31, 2011, via "Mail Box Rule" submitted a Motion to 
Amend Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, one page, and Petitioner's Response to 
Courts Notice of Intent to Dismiss. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION 
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APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD 
Idaho Code 19-4906 of the Uniform Post-Conviction Relief Act authorizes the 
District Court to permit Amendment of the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
See: Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 426, 745 P.2d 305 (Ct.App. 1987), and is 
appropriate in doing so when the District Court has issued a Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief. 
GROUND TO AMEND 
Petitioner is not trained in the science of law and is only able to file the 
pending matter with the assistance of another inmate who has experience in these 
matters that are presently before the District Court and prison policy permits such 
legal assistance from other inmates. 
Petitioner filed the pending matters before the District Court while housed 
at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC) and then was transferred just after the 
receipt of the District Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss and then submitted on 
March 31, 2011, the Motion to Amend Petition for Post-conviction Relief and 
Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent To Dismiss. 
Petitioner seeks leave to amend the petition that is presently before the 
District Court so as to cure any and all defects in the current petition and attempt 
to overcome this Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss with a First Amended Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief and First Affidavit of Facts in Support of First Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief along with other pleadings to further the 
petitioner in defeating this Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. 
Petitioner seeks FORTY-FIVE (45) days from the date of this Court's Order to 
Submit the First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief along with any other 
supporting pleadings that petition may want this court to consider if this Motion 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief petitioner requests that that this Court grant him leave to amend 
and for any other relief that may be permitted by law. 
Respectfully submitted this APRIL.~S , 2011. 
Woodrow J. Grant, Petitioner 
VE~IFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
County of ADA ) 
WOODROW J. GRANT, being sworn under oath deposes and says: 
I am the petitioner in the above-entitled matter, and that all statements are 
true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Woodrow J. Grant, Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN and AFFI~MED to before me this APRIL 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on APRIL~8 , 2011, I mailed a copy of this MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF for the purposes of filing with 
the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via prison mail system for 
processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
BANNOCK COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF -4-
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Woodrow J. Grant, Petitioner 
WOODROW GRANT 
80692, ISCI Unit-13 
Post' Office Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Petitioner 
' t ~ .- ! f 
~~ ··T 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUUDIDIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW GRANT, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
oOo 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______________________________ ) 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR 
RECONSIDER ORDER DISMISSING 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
COMES NOW, Woodrow Grant, Petitioner pro se, in the above-captioned 
matter, who in accordance with Rule 59(e), 60(b), and ll(a){2)(B), I.R.C.P., 
brings forth this Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider the district court's 
May ll, 2011, Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, for the 
reasons set forth more fully below. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Petitioner's motion to alter or amend the judgment is brought pursuant 
to Rules 59(e), 60{b) and ll(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 59(e) provides that "[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment." In this 
case, the Court's Order dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was 
filed May 11, 2011, and the petitioner received it via u.s. Mail at the ISCI 
Facility where petitioner is housed on May 13, 2011. This motion is therefore 
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per the "MAIL BOX RULE" for petitioner delivered it to prison officials for 
~~~ 
the purposes of mailing to the Court Clerk on MAY ;(If , 2011. See: Hayes v. 
State, 143 Idaho 88, 91, 137 P.3d 475, 478 (Ct. App.2006). 
A review of appellate case law suggests that Rule 59( e), 60(b), and 
ll(a)(2)(B), have all been used to challenge a district court's dismissal of a 
petition for post-conviction relief. See: Lee v. State, 122 Idaho 196, 832 
P.2d ll31 (1992) (appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59( e) following the Court's Order denying the 
petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief.); Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 
731, 228 P.3d 998, 1004 (2010) (holding that relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) 
may be appropriate for dismissal of post-conviction relief action pursuant to 
I .R.C.P. 60(b) (6) upon a showing of "unique and compelling circumstances"); 
Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 628, 836 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992) (in 
dicta - "The time for filing the appeal, however, was extended by the filing 
of Freeman's motion to reconsider the dismissal which was timely filed within 
fourteen days of the order to be reconsidered. I.R.C.P. ll(a) (2) (B); I.C.R. 
57(b); I.A.R. 14. II). 
The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is squarely 
within the court's discretion. Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 159 P.3d 937 
( 2007) . Abuse of discretion is determined by a three part test which asks 
whether the district court " ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted wtihin the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." 
Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754, 760 (2007) (quoting Sun Valley 
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Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 
479 (2004)) (citing Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 
(2001)). 
A rehearing or reconsideration in the trial court usually involves new 
or additional facts, and a more comprehensive presentation of both law and 
fact. Couer d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 
8l2t 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). Indeed, chief virtue of reconsideration 
is to obtain a full and complete presentation of all available facts, so that 
the truth may be ascertained, and justice is done. Id. 
A motion for reconsideration need not present new evidence but may be 
based upon an argument that the legal conclusion reached were incorrect or 
that the Court did not consider relevant facts. Id. See also Johnson v. 
Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct.App. 2006). 
GROUNDS TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER ORDER 
A. Introduction 
After careful review of this Court's Order dismissing Mr. Grant's 
petition for post-conviction relief. This Court, within its May 11, 2011, 
Order set forth a list of reasons as to why it was dismissing Mr. Grant's 
petition by stating he "failed to provide enough material facts in order to 
substantiate all of the ten claims he set forth within the petition". 
This court further stated an "Analysis" and "Notice of Deficiencies" 
with a "Discussion" specifically pointing Mr. Grant failed to provide the 
Court with any new information after giving its Notice of Intent to Dismiss on 
March 17, 2011, pursuant to § 19-4906(b). Petitioner on May 5, 2011, had 
submitted a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in 
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order to properly cure any and all defects in the current petition and attempt 
to overcome this Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss with a First Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and First Affidavit of Facts in Support of 
First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. This Court denied this 
Motion on May 13, 2011, two days after this Court's Order of Summary Dismissal 
of the Petition for Post-conviction Relief. 
B. SUIIIllary Dismissal Standard 
A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from 
underlying criminal actions which led to the petitioner's conviction. Peltier 
v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). It is a civil 
proceeding governed by the Uniform Post-conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter, 
UPCA) (Idaho Code §§ 19-4901 - 4911) and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456, 808 P.2d at 375. Because it is a civil proceeding, 
the petitioner must prove his allegations by a perponderance of the evidence. 
Matinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct.App. 1995). 
However, the petitioner initiating post-conviction proceeding differs from the 
complaint initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition is required to 
include more than "a short plain statement of the claim"; it "must be verified 
with respect to the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and 
affidavits, records or evidence supporting it allegations must be attached, or 
the application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached." Id. 
19-4903. "In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by 
admissible evidence supporting the allegations, or the application will be 
subject to dismissal." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P. 2d 1151 
( Ct.App. 1998). 
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If the petitioner presents some shred of evidentiary support of his 
allegations, the district court must take the petitioner's allegations as true 
at least until such time as they are controverted by the state. Tramel v. 
State, 92 Idaho 643, 646, 448 P.2d 649, 652 (1986). this is so even if the 
allegations appear incredible on their fact. Id. Thus only after the State 
controverts the petitioner's allegations can the district court consider the 
evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 651 P.2d 546 (Ct.App. 1982). But in 
doing so, it must still liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable 
inferences in favor of the petitioner. Small, 132 Idaho 917, 971 P.2d at 1155. 
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must 
conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 Idaho at 
331, 971 P. 2d at 1155. If there is no question of fact, and the state is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissal can be ordered sua sponte, 
or pursuant to the State's Motion. I.e. § 19-4906(b), (c). 
C. DISCUSSION 
Mr. Grant had raised several ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
within his petition for post-conviction relief. As such, Mr. Grant hereby sets 
forth his claims in a more clearer fashion in order for this Court to properly 
reconsider its May 11, 2011, order and if so issue an order altering and 
amending said order, along with new additional facts. 
Claim One: Trial Counsel Ineffectiveness. Trial Counsel, Douglas Dykman, was 
ineffective in representing Mr. Grant. As a result, Mr. Grant's right to 
effective assistance of counsel under the "right to counsel" clause of the 
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States was violated, and via 
the Fourteenth Amendment "due process of law" clause, in violation of the 
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"right to counsel" clause of Art. I, Sec. 13 of the Constitution of the State 
of Idaho. See: Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984); among others. 
This claim is based specifically on Mr. Grant's trial counsel's failure to 
represent him as follows: 
a) Trial Counsel failed to disqualify Judge; 
b) Trial Counsel failed to file motion for change of venue; 
c) Mr. Grant was denied Conflict-Free Counsel; 
d) Trial Counsel coerced Mr. Grant to plead guilty; 
e) Trial Counsel failed to have the Doctor who performed the Mental 
Health Evaluation at the sentencing hearing to offer mitigating 
evidence;at the sentencing hearing; 
f) Trial Counsel failed to bring forth at sentencing a witness to offer 
mitigating testimony. at the sentencing hearing. 
In regards to the Six ( 6) claims above, Mr. Grant already presented in 
the original petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Grant hereby sets forth 
new and additional facts in a more comprehensive presentation of both law and 
fact in order for this Court to reconsider its May 11, 2011, for the legal 
conclusions reached were incorrect based upon relevant facts. 
DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS 
1. Mr. Grant • s Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to disqualify 
the Judge and 100tion for change in venue. 
i. facts pertaining to claims 
While Mr. Grant was being held in the Bannock County Jail ( "BCJ") he was 
appointed an attorney, Douglas Dykman, to represent him. 
Upon Dykman being appointed to represent Mr. Grant, counsel came to the 
BCJ and visited him in November 2009. Mr. Grant communicated to Counsel at 
that time he wished to have Judge Naftz disqualified and a motion for change 
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of venue be filed. 
Mr. Grant explained to counsel the reason that he wished to have Judge 
Naftz disqualifed was due to the fact that he had once represented his 
brother, Chet Grant, in a felony case and Mr. Grant did not want Judge Naftz 
opinon of his brother when he represented him to have any inferences that may 
be negative towards him as such. This request to disqualify the Judge was 
without cause as well. 
Mr. Grant further requested that a motion for change in venue be filed 
due to the domestic abuse charge involved the daughter of the secretary of the 
Pocatello Police Chief. Mr. Grant felt that with the victims mother's 
employment would have undue influence with the Court due to her direct 
involvement with law enforcement and the court's. 
Mr. Dykman refused to do either of these requests by stating to Mr. 
Grant, "I'm not going to do this and it won't get us anywhere." and refused to 
file the motion to disqualify the Judge. Counsel further stated in respects to 
the motion for change in venue by stating, "I will not put in a motion for 
change of venue because it won't help at all." or words to that effect. 
ii. why relief should be granted 
Mr. Grant would contend that despite the district court's reasoning in 
the May 11, 2011, Order, regarding the disqualification of Judge. At the time 
of Mr. Grant's request the rule to disqualify without cause was in effect. It 
is not for trial counsel to question as to why Mr. Grant wanted to disqualify 
the Judge. Mr. Grant should have been entitled to the disqualification motion 
to be filed by counsel. It is not a strategic nor a tactile decision for 
Counsel to make. He should have just done as requested for Mr. Grant was 
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entitled under due process of law to disqualify one Judge without cause as the 
Rule allows under Idaho criminal Rules. 
As to change of venue, Mr. Grant contends that it was proper for counsel 
to file this motion at the least, and demonstrate for the record the 
relationship of the victim and the victim's mother and place of employment in 
order to demonstrate undue prejudice in taking the matter to tiral in Bannock 
County opposed to another count. If at the least, the motion is filed and if 
denied then Mr. Grant has the due process right to appeal that decision after 
being convicted and sentenced if he so chooses to in a Direct Appeal. 
Secondly, Mr. Grant at the time of these two requests was invoking his 
right to a Jury Trial. As such, it would have been proper for counsel to at 
least file both motion and support them with the grounds that Mr. Grant had 
provided in order to preserve the matter for appeal. As to the motion for 
disqualification, Counsel should have filed it immediately without cause and 
it would have been granted and the case would have been reassigned by the 
Administrative Judge of the Sixth District. 
2. Mr. Grant was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to conflict-free 
Counsel during the Trial Court proceedings. 
i. facts pertaining to claim 
Mr. Grant while being housed in the BCJ was visited by counsel several 
times during the pre-trial stages of his case. Counsel durring these visits 
had continually attempted to get Mr. Grant to accept a non-binding plea bargin 
offer to the new charges of domestic battery and the possession of a 
controlled substance charges. These offers only consisted of non-binding plea 
agreements in which Mr. Grant was opposed to the offers and would refuse them 
each and every time for he wanted a binding Rule 11 plea agreement. This was 
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due to the fact Mr. Grant was affraid if he did not get a binding Rule ll plea 
agreement the sentencing court would make his new charges consecutive to the 
felony charges he was on probation for at the time of his arrest on these two 
new charges. Counsel kept telling Mr. Grant if he did not accept the plea 
offer he would get 15 years if he went to trial and it could be consecutive to 
the charge he was currently on probation for. 
In April or May 2010, at a pre-trial conference before the district 
court, Mr. Grant verbally motioned the court for new counsel to represent him 
for there was a breakdown in communication. Counsel, Douglas Dykman, also 
verbally motioned the court to be removed and new counsel be appointed to 
represent Mr. Grant due to the breakdown in communication. 
The district court denied both Mr. Grant and Douglas Dykman's request 
regarding the appointment of new counsel for Mr. Grant by stating that it was 
in the court's opinion that Mr. Grant had one of the better attorney's to 
represent him on the matters before the court and ordered Mr. Dykman to 
continue to represent Mr. Grant despite the fact that there was a known 
breakdown in communication. 
ii. why relief should be granted 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 
13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees the the right to counsel. The right to 
counsel does not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one's choice. 
State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1058, 772 P.2d 263, 265 (Ct.App.l989). Mere 
lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily grounds 
for substitute counsel in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. State v. 
McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 729, 620 P.2d 300, 302 (1980); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 
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71L 713, 946 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct.App.l997). However, for "good cause" a trial 
court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an indigent 
defendant. I.e. § 19-856; State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 10001 
1001 (1980); Peck, 130 Idaho at 713, 946 P.2d at 1353. The trial court must 
afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and 
reasons in support of a motion for substitution of counsel after having been 
made aware of the problems involved. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898, 606 P.2d at 
1002. 
Here the district court did conduct some form of a review of this 
matter, but in Mr. Grant's opinion the district court deprived Mr. Grant of a 
full and fair opportunity to explain his problems and the court's review of 
Grant's request for new counsel did not encompass the totality of his claims. 
Mr. Grant had expressed that the purpose for substitution of counsel was 
due to the fact that he and counsel had a breakdown in communication. More 
specifically, Counsel continually attempted to get Grant to take a plea offer 
and he would continually refuse for it was not a binding Rule 11 agreement. 
Counsel was persistant with his efforts regarding this and as a result a 
breakdown in communication occurred. Counsel even after Mr. Grant had 
attempted to have new counsel appointed for he wished to fire Mr. Dykman had 
attempted on his own accord to remove himself as counsel of record for Mr. 
Grant. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 593, 181 
P. 3d 512, 522 ( 2008) held in remanding his case back to the district court 
that "[T] he court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to 
determine the nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of 
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the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with his 
or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion 
requires substitution or even to such an extent that his or her Sixth 
Amendment right would be violated but for substitution. 145 Idaho at 593, 181 
P.3d at 522. Good cause includes an actual conflict of interest: a complete, 
irrevocable breakdown of communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which 
leads to an apparently unjust verdict. Id. See Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 
1314, 1320, (8th Cir .1991) (citing cases) ; McKee v. Harris 649 F. 2d 927, 931 
( 2d Cir .1981). 
In United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (lOth Cir.2002)(decision 
sets forth factors to be used in examining constitutional implication of a 
total breakdown in communication: (1) whether the defendant's motion for new 
counsel was timely; ( 2) whether the trial court adequately inquired into 
defendant's reasons for making the motion; (3) whether the defendant-attorney 
conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding 
an adequate defense; and (4) whether the defendant substantially and 
unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown): State v. Torres, 208 
Ariz. 340, 93 P.3d 1056, 1060-61 (2004); State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 793, 
760 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Ct.App.l988). If good cause is shown, the defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to the appointment of new counsel. Vessey, 967 P.2d 
at 964. 
Here, Mr. Grant did not manufacture the conflict of interest. Counsel 
created it when Mr. Grant informed him that he wished to take the matter to 
trial unless he would receive a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, thus creating 
a irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict as will 
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be demonstrated in the next claim being presented. 
Based upon the forgoing, Mr. Grant was deprived of conflict free counsel 
by the district court, and was forced to have an attorney who had already 
established on the record a conflict in representing Mr. Grant. As a result, 
the district court denied Mr. Grant's Sixth Amendment Right to conflict free 
counsel. 
3. Trial Counsel coerced Mr. Grant into pleading guilty. 
i. facts pertaining to claim 
Mr. Grant hereby incorporates the facts pertaining to the previous 
claim, and why relief should be granted in respects to said claim regarding 
conflict free counsel as if restated in its entirety. 
After the pre-trial hearing that took place in which Mr. Grant had 
attempted to remove Mr. Dykman as counsel, and the court denying Mr. Dykman's 
motion as well. Mr. Dykman had met with Mr. Grant's parents, Eric and Eunice 
Grant, outside the Courtroom and spoke with them. What Mr. Dykman stated to 
them at this meeting was repeated to Mr. Grant at a visit he had with his 
mother, Eunice Grant, at the BCJ. 
Eunice Grant informed Mr. Grant that Mr. Dykman had told them that "You 
need to tell your son that he needs to take the deal or he is probably going 
to get 15 years fixed. If he does take it the most he will do is 4 years fixed 
on both new charges ran concurrent with the previous charge" that Mr. Grant 
was currently on probation for. 
As a result of this conversation with Mr. Dykman, both of Mr. Grant's 
parents came to the BCJ the same day he spoke with them to visit Mr. Grant and 
informed him of the conversation that took place that day after court. Both of 
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Mr. Grant's parents told him to take the deal that Mr. Dykman had offered to 
him for fear of loosing him to prison for 15 years. Mr. Grant informed both 
parents "NO" regarding taking the plea offer that was conveyed to him by 
counsel for he knew it was a trick to get him to plead guilty to the domestic 
battery for it carried 10 years maximum and he wasn't going to take it unless 
he received a binding Rule 11 Agreement in where the court and the prosecution 
were bound to see that he only get 4 years concurrent with all other charges. 
Several days transpired after Mr. Grant's meeting with his parents and 
his mother still being upset over the matter began to have bi-polar episodes 
over the events that took place and caused Mr. Grant to become manically 
depressed as well. 
Upon subpoena Mr. Grant's parent 1 s both can offer testimony to these 
events as well if the Court so chooses to grant a hearing on these matters. 
Mr. Dykman appeared at the BCJ after Mr. Grant's last appearance in 
court and his last visit with his parents when they conveyed Mr. Dykman 1 s 
message to them to relay to Mr. Grant. Again, counsel presented to Mr. Grant 
the same deal, plead guilty to possession and domestic battery and the state 
would drop possession of a firearm, aggravated assault and the state would 
also recommend to run all charges concurrent with Mr. Grant's 2005 aggravated 
batter charge. Counsel also promised Mr. Grant that Judge Naftz assured him 
that he had no problem with running all charges concurrent, and further 
counsel assured Mr. Grant that would get no more than 4 years on the 
possession and domestic charges. 
Despite the fact that the plea offer was non-binding counsel had assured 
Mr. Grant that this was what he would get for a sentence and was the only 
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reason he opted to take the non-binding plea agreement was based upon 
counsel's promises and assurances. As a result, Counsel then began to assist 
Mr. Grant in filing out the the Guilty Plea Questionnaire From. Idaho Criminal 
Rules Appendix A, April 22, 2010, by telling Mr. Grant specifically what box's 
to check on the form and what to write on the lines if it required further 
information. 
ii. why relief should be granted 
A plea of guilty which is the result of coercion is invalid. Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 u.s. 239, 89 s.ct. 1709 (1969). However, coercion is not limited 
to threats of physical violence. Many acts far short of physical violence have 
been asserted constituting coercion. Some of these claims have been 
successful. As set forth below on the issue of coercion, the Idaho Courts are 
in open disagreement with the Federal Courts on what constitutes coercions. 
However, on the basic issue1 there is no disagreement. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 647, 488 P.2d 
649, 652 ( 1968) Justice Spear stated: "Additionally, if at such a hearing the 
appellant can prove by a perponderance of the evidence that he was, in fact, 
coerced to change his plea of "not guilty" to one of "guilty" ••• he is entitled 
to relief from that conviction. Goff v. State, 91 Idaho 361 415 P.2d 679 
(1966)." 
Here 1 Mr. Grant has first established that counsel was a conflict and 
was created by the district court when it refused to appoint Mr. Grant new 
counsel. This in turn with counsel's actions after both 1 Mr. Grant and 
counsel, being denied appointment and removal from the case brings Mr. Grant's 
allegations regarding coercion in his favor. Counsel's failure to pursue 
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favorable plea negotiations on Mr. Grant's behalf, which was motivated by a 
conflict of interest, established ineffective assistance of counsel. See Edens 
v. Hannigan, 87 F.3d 1109 (lOth Cir.l996). 
Several Circuit Court's have addressed ineffective of assistance of 
counsel regarding coerced guilty plea's. U.S. V. Giardino 797 F. 2d 30 ( ls t 
Cir.l986) (trial counsel lied to defendant to induce a guilty plea constitutes 
ineffective assistance and requires the plea to be set aside); Moore v. u.s., 
950 F.2d 656 (lOth Cir.l991) (Coerciion by trial counsel or the prosecutor to 
induce guilty plea renders the plea involuntary) • It is clear based on the 
facts presented herein and previous pleadings on file have substantiated this 
fact. Furthermore, Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 133, 139 (7th Cir.l986) 
(defendant must allege terms of promise by counsel; when, where, and by whom 
such promisis were made and the precise identity of any witnesses tot he 
promise). Mr. Grant has substantiated this very clearly as well. 
Due to counsel having told Mr. Grant if he did not take the deal he 
would get 15 years fixed has rendered his plea involuntary. This was addressed 
in Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510 (1962) (A plea of 
guilty, if induced by "promises" or threats, which deprive it of the character 
of a voluntary act "is void and open to collateral attack"). 
As a result of this Mr. Grant's plea being coerced it is clear that an 
evidentiary hearing must be held. See Dugan v. United States, 521 F. 2d 23L 
233 (5th Cir.l975) (allegations accompanied by credible affidavits that raise 
a substantial inference that an unkept bargain was made warrant an evidentiary 
hearing; courts should be "liberal in requiring a particular form of 
affidavit"); u.s. v. Espinoza, 866 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir.l988) (Trial Counsel's 
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promise that defendant would receive a specific sentence to induce guilty plea 
required an evidentiary hearing to resolve the claim if ineffectiveness of 
counsel). 
Based upon the foregoing this court should vacate its May 11, 2011, 
order summarily dismissing Mr. Grant's petition fro post-conviction relief. 
4. Trial Counsel failed to have the Doctor who perfomred the Mental 
Health Evaluation at the sentencing hearing to offer mitigating 
evidence at the sentencing hearing. 
i. facts pertaining to claim 
At the completion of the district court conducting the guilty plea 
hearing, the district court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI) 
along with a mental health evaluation be done prior to sentencing in order to 
assist the court in sentencing Mr. Grant. 
Mr. Grant met with the Doctor who performed the Mental Health Evaluation 
three (3) times. The first was to perform several series of tests. Upon 
completion of the first set of tests the Doctor came back two (2) more times 
and performed additional interviews with Mr. Grant along with other testing. 
At Mr. Grant's third interview and testing session with the Doctor he 
had inquired from Mr. Grant who his attorney was. Mr. Grant provided Mr. 
Dykman's name to the Doctor and he instructed Mr. Grant to have his counsel 
contact him regarding his testing and evaluation in order to inform Counsel 
that Mr. Grant was an excellent canidate for Mental Health Court. 
The Doctor informed Mr. Grant that he based his recommendation for 
Mental Health Court upon several factors but the one he had informed Mr. Grant 
of was the fact that he had not been taking his medication for his bi-polar 
condition. 
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As result Mr. Grant contacted his mother via phone from the BCJ and 
asked her to contact Mr. Dykman and come to see him at the BCJ so he could 
discuss the mental health evaluation issues that the Doctor had discussed with 
him. 
Mr. Dykman came to the BCJ a few days latter and saw Mr. Grant. Mr. 
Grant then informed counsel then that the Doctor had stated that he was a good 
canidate for mental health court and had asked him to contact the Doctor to 
confer with him on this very important matter. Counsel told Mr. Grant at the 
meeting "That's good news but the prosecution would have to go for it and they 
never would." or words to that effect. 
Mr. Grant then requested Counsel to have the Doctor at the sentencing 
hearing to offer further testimony in regards to his evaluation and his 
recommendation so that it was fully explained to the court and if any question 
as to the evaluation was to come up by the prosecution, the court or Mr. 
Grant's counsel it would be able to be answered without just guessing what the 
Doctor intended his meaning to be. 
ii. why relief should be granted 
Mr. Grant has clearly set forth more facts for this court to reconsider 
its previous decision regarding this matter. As such, it is clear that despite 
what the district court stated in regards to this matter the district court 
only looked to the Guilty Plea Questionnaire form when the plea was taken and 
not the sentencing hearing. 
Despite this fact. Mr. Grant has offered new and additional facts in a 
more comprehensive presentation of facts shows that the court's May 11, 2011 
decision regarding this matter was incorrect. 
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It is clear that there is issues presented herein that require an 
evidentiary hearing for there are facts in dispute regarding this matter due 
to Mr. Grant's communication with counsel prior to the sentencing hearing. As 
such, this court should vacate its May ll, 2011, order and hold further 
proceedings in line with this Motion. 
Trial Counsel's failure to introduce evidence in the accused's favor 
during sentencing hearing constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.See 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 u.s. 362 (2001); Austin v. Bell, 125 F.3d 843 (6th 
Cir.l997). 
5. Trial Counsel failed to bring forth at sentencing a witness to 
offer mitigating testimony at the sentencing hearing. 
i. facts pertaining to claim 
Upon Mr. Dykman being appointed to represent Mr. Grant, counsel had 
obtained an Investigator by Motion and Order of the Court. Ths was due to the 
fact that counsel could not find any Police Report from any witnesses, and 
Ashley gulgeman was the only witness to what had occurred. 
The Investigator that Counsel obtained had conducted an investigation 
into the charges that Mr. Grant was facing. As a result the Investigator had 
located a key witness, Ashley Gulgelman, who was the only witness to the 
domestic batter charge. 
It was discovered by the investigator had discovered that 90% of the 
vitcims statement to the police was fabricated and embelished, and that Det. 
Oak had actually conducted an interview with Gulgleman and intentionally lost 
and/or misplaced the Police Report which was exculpatory evidence. Mr. Dykman 
did not press this issue at all. 
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Counsel told Mr. Grant that based upon the Investigator's findings 
regarding the actual events that took place in regards to the domestic battery 
charge he was going to have Ashly Gulgleman at his sentencing hearing in order 
to offer mitigating evidence to the case. Counsel further stated that this 
would benefit him, as well as aid in possibly being placed in mental health 
court and probation. Counsel failed to have her present at the sentencing 
hearing and as a result caused me prejudice. 
ii. why relief should be granted 
The substantive federal law is well-established. Under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Mr. Grant must demonstrate both that his 
counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an objective 
standard of resonableness," and that the deficiency was prejudicial. 
Strickland, 466 u.s at 687-88, 692. To show prejudice, Mr. Grant must only 
demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would undermine the 
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. 
Once Mr. Grant has alleged facts which if true would constitute 
deficient performance the legal presumption dissolves. Therefore, Mr. Grant 
pleads a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel because it 
is well-established law that inadequate preparation by defense counsel may 
violate the Sixth Amendment. State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 10, 539 P.2d 556, 
562 (1975); see also, Pompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 u.s. 362, 396 (2000) (unreasonable failure to conduct through 
investigation); see also, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense 
Function, § 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added). 
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The failure of Counsel to have Ashly Gulgleman at the sentencing hearing 
to offer mitigating facts before the trial court sentenced him. This failure, 
in turn, prejudiced Mr. Grant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this Motion to Alter or Amend with new and 
additional facts as well as argument it is requested that this Court: 
l. VACATE its May ll, 2011, Order Dismissing Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief; 
2. APPOINT counsel to represent petitioner based upon the additional 
facts and evidence presented herein; 
3. FIND that the cumulative impact of counsel's deficiencies prejudiced 
petitioner. In addition to finding prejudice form individual deficiencies are 
cumulatively prejudicial; 
4. FIND that petitioner's sentence was not voluntary and coerced and as 
a result grant the relief of a new sentence on the Domestic Battery Charge of 
seven years, with two years fixed followed by two years indeterminate, and on 
the possession charge a sentence of seven years with two years fixed, followed 
by five years indeterminate to run concurrent with CR-2005-10583-FE; suspend 
said sentence and place Mr. Grant in Mental Health Court; 
5. GRANT any further relief as this court may deem just and proper as 
allowed by law. 
- ,.J{ 
Respectfully submitted this MAY ~' 2011. 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of ADA 
WOODROW GRANr, being sworn under oath deposes and says, that he is the 
Petitioner in the in the above-entitled motion and has read the foregoing, 
and that all statements are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and 
belief, and is an Affidavit in and of itself. 
SUBSCRIBED, 
Woodrow Grant 
2<1 I 2011. 
AtitJ.v(64~ 
~tary Public for Idaho 
Commission expires: v ~'fjz.c({, 
I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on MAY~, 2011, I deposited an original of the 
forgoing in the Prison Legal Mail System to be filed with the Court and true 
and correct copies to be served as well via u.s. Mail postage prepaid to: 
Mark L. Hiedernan 
Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney 
624 E. Center, Rm. 220 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW GRANT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
ORDER DISMISSING 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case comes before this Court on a Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed by 
Woodrow Grant ("the Petitioner" or "Mr. Grant"). On March 1 7, 2011 , pursuant to Idaho Code 
("IC") §19-4906 this Court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss ("Notice") Mr. Grant's petition, 
indicating its intent to dismiss each of the claims raised and providing Mr. Grant the 20 days 
required by statute to submit a reply appropriately addressing his arguments and providing 
satisfactory evidence that he is entitled to post conviction relief. 
On April4, 2011, the Petitioner submitted a Motion to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, wherein the Petitioner requested this Court "review the underlying criminal records 
including, but not limited to the county jail's records during defendant's stay there, the psych-
evaluation, and the past and current medical records including mental health files." (Mot. to Amend 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, April4, 2011, 1.) Along with that motion, Mr. Grant also 
submitted the Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss, which did not include 
any additional documents or affidavits. Nor did his response include information not previously 
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considered and addressed by this Court in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss. The State filed nothing in 
response. Further background on this matter was set out in detail in the Notice and is incorporated 
herein by reference. 1 
This Court is fully briefed in the Petitioner's allegations and the law. Furthermore, this 
Court has carefully reviewed the Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, as well as the Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss. Based upon 
the following discussion, this Court hereby DIMISSES the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
ISSUES 
1 . Whether to grant the Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 
2. Whether to grant the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
DISCUSSION 
In his Response to Court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss, Mr. Grant again requested the 
appointment of counsel, stating: "Grant is currently incarcerated and cannot gather the records 
and evidence which he wanted to be put on record." (Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss ("Petitioner's Response"), April4, 2011, 1.) Mr. Grant further argued "he 
doesn't have the ability or legal knowledge to represent himself personally to the standards this 
Court is accustomed to." (!d.) The Petitioner additionally re-alleged the claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel previously addressed by this Court in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss. 
1 The Notice also contains a thorough analysis ofthe Post-Conviction Relief statute and is not repeated in detail 
here. 
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1. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 
a. Standard of Review 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction proceeding is governed by 
Idaho Code ("IC") § 19-49042, which provides that a court-appointed attorney may be made 
available to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation. Charboneau v. State, 
140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). The decision to grant or deny a request for 
court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Id. (citing Fox v. State, 
129 Idaho 881, 934 P.2d 947 (Idaho Ct.App. 1997)). When a district court is presented with a 
request for appointed counsel, the court will address that request before ruling on the substantive 
issues in the case. Id. 
Under IC § 19-4904, the court "should determine if the petitioner is able to afford counsel 
and whether this is a situation in which counsel should be appointed to assist the petitioner." Id. 
at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. In making this analysis, the court considers the typical problems with 
pro se pleadings, such as the fact that these types of pleadings are often conclusory and 
incomplete and that facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because the pro se 
petitioner does not know what they may be. !d. (citing Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d 
138 (2001)). The court must examine the record to determine "whether the facts are such that 
they justify the appointment of counsel." !d. at 794, 102 P .3d at 1113. In doing so, every 
2 § 19-4904. Inability to pay costs. 
If the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of representation, including stenographic, printing, witness 
fees and expenses, and legal services, these costs and expenses, and a court-appointed attorney may be made 
available to the applicant in the preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal, and paid, on order of 
the district court, by the county in which the application is filed. 
Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
3 
inference must run in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented and cannot be 
expected to know how to allege the necessary facts. /d. At a minimum, the court "must 
carefully consider the request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the substantive merits of 
the petition." /d. 
If, after examining a petitioner's claims, the court determines that such claims are 
frivolous, "it is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of the claimed defects so he 
has an opportunity to respond." /d. at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. If the petitioner alleges facts that 
raise the possibility of a valid claim, the court should appoint counsel in order to give the 
petitioner an opportunity, working with counsel, to properly allege the necessary supporting 
facts. /d.; see also, Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491,493,95 P.3d 642,644 (Idaho Ct.App. 
2004) (Although the petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the 
record for possible nonfrivolous claims, he should be provided with a meaningful opportunity to 
supplement the record and to renew his request for court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal 
ofhis petition where he has alleged facts supporting some elements of a valid claim.). The court 
"should provide sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to 
supplement the request with the necessary additional facts, if they exist." /d. 
"[A] district court presented with a request for appointed counsel in a post-conviction 
action must address that request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case and errs if it 
denies a petition on the merits before ruling on the applicant's request for counsel." Judd v. 
State, 148 Idaho 22,218 P.3d 1, 2 (Idaho Ct.App. 2009). 
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However, 
an order that simultaneously dismisses a post-conviction action and denies a motion for 
appointment of counsel will be upheld on appeal if the petitioner received notice of the 
fatal deficiencies of the petition and if, when the standard governing a motion for 
appointment of counsel is correctly applied, the request for counsel would properly be 
denied - that is, when the petitioner did not allege facts raising even the possibility of a 
valid claim. 
!d. at 4. A determination regarding a request for the appointment of counsel and a determination 
regarding whether a petition for post conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal are thus 
governed by "quite different standards, with the threshold showing that is necessary in order to 
gain appointment of counsel being considerably lower than that which is necessary to avoid 
summary dismissal of a petition." !d. 
b. Analysis 
This Court must examine the petition to determine whether the facts alleged justify the 
appointment of counsel. If such facts appear to this Court to be frivolous, or the situation 
presented does not appear to be one in which counsel should be appointed to assist the Petitioner, 
this Court may deny the request for counsel. 
Based on the following findings, this Court hereby DENIES the Petitioner's Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel, as the allegations made by the Petitioner are frivolous for the reasons 
stated herein. Furthermore, this Court finds the Petitioner did not allege facts raising even the 
possibility of a valid claim. Therefore, the appointment of counsel is not required. 
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2. Notice of Deficiencies 
a. Standard of Review 
In Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007), the Idaho Supreme 
Court set forth this thorough and clear statement of the legal standard that applies to a petition 
for post conviction relief: 
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction 
Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 
1278, 1282 (2001). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction 
relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the 
application for post-conviction relief is based. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 
(2000). Unlike the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application for post-
conviction relief must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that 
would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an application for post-
conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of 
the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The application must include affidavits, records, or other 
evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not 
included. ld 
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the 
applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). On 
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary 
hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will 
liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 
Gilpin-Grubb v. State. 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002), citing LaBelle v. State, 
130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct.App.l997). A court is required to accept the 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. 
Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). When the alleged facts, 
even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the 
application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 
801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990), citing Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 
1190 (1975). Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of 
relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record ofthe original proceedings, or (2) 
do not justify relief as a matter of law. ld 
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"On appeal from a summary disposition, [the Court of Appeals] exercises free review. 
Yon v. State, 124 Idaho 821,822,864 P.2d 659,660 (Ct.App.1993); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 
145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct.App.l988)." Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 382, 924 P.2d 
1225, 1228 (Idaho Ct.App. 1996). 
DISCUSSION 
As explained, Mr. Grant's Response to the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss concerns 
the alleged failure of his counsel to adequately represent him. The Petitioner did not raise any 
arguments not already addressed by this Court; nor did the Petitioner provide this Court with any 
new information. The Petitioner set forth ten grounds in support of his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. This Court will address each in tum. 
a. Standard of Review Governing a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
"In order to establish a violation of the constitutional guarantee to effective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice." Beasley 
v. State, 126 Idaho 356,359,883 P.2d 714,717 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994) (internal citations 
omitted). The test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received the effective 
assistance of counsel is two-pronged and requires that the petitioner establish: (1) counsel's 
conduct was deficient because it fell outside the wide range of professional norms; and (2) the 
petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the deficient conduct. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 
6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000); Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101,982 P.2d 931,936 (1999) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052,2064 (1984)). "Facts presented 
must be in the form of competent, admissible evidence. Bare assertions and speculation, 
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unsupported by specific facts, do not suffice to show ineffectiveness of counsel." Roman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 644,649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994)(internal citations omitted). 
In assessing the reasonableness of attorney performance, counsel is presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834; State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300, 
306-07, 986 P.2d 323, 329-30 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Strategic and tactical 
decisions will not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post conviction relief under a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review. 
Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834; Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 
(1994), cert denied 513 U.S. 1130 (1995). To satisfY the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, 
the applicant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Milburn v. 
State, 135 Idaho 701, 706, 23 P.3d 775, 780 (Idaho Ct.App. 2000)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694); Fox v. State, 125 Idaho 672, 674, 873 P.2d 926, 928 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994). The applicant 
must show that the attorney's deficient conduct 'so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.' Milburn, 
135 Idaho at 706, 23 P.3d at 780 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). The applicant must show 
actual unreasonable performance by trial counsel and actual prejudice. /d. "Hence, dismissal is 
proper if the applicant fails to meet his burden under either part." Fox, 125 Idaho at 674, 873 
P.2d at 928; Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903 ("To avoid summary dismissal, a post-
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conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must sufficiently allege facts under both 
prongs of the test."). 
b. Analysis 
1. Change of venue/Change of judges 
The Petitioner again argued his counsel was ineffective by "failing to request a change of 
venue or the recusal" of the judge. (Petitioner's Response at 2.) As this Court explained in its 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss, counsel's failure to secure a change of venue or to request a new 
judge are not appropriate issues for review in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. "The 
reasons for a change of venue, as set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 2l(a) and 2l(b)3, are that a fair 
and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the case is pending or that the convenience 
of the parties and the witnesses would best be served by a change of the venue." State v. Fee, 
124 Idaho 170, 175, 857 P.2d 649, 654 (Idaho Ct.App. 1993). "[T]he issue of whether a change 
of venue should be requested is a matter of trial strategy and tactical choice, not subject to review 
as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the absence of proof of inadequate preparation 
or ignorance on counsel's part. State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 923, 655 P.2d 434, 440 (1982)." 
!d. Likewise, "the decision whether to request the recusal of a trial judge is a strategic matter, 
one which should be left to the discretion ofthe attorney. See Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 
3 Rule 21. Change of venue 
(a) For Prejudice. The court upon motion of either party shall transfer the proceeding to another county if the court 
is satisfied that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the case is pending. 
(b) Other Cases. For the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, the court upon motion 
of the defendant may transfer the proceedings as to the defendant to another county. 
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877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994)." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 333, 971 P.2d 1151, 1157 (Idaho 
Ct.App. 1999). 
In this case, there is nothing in the record to establish the basis for a change of venue or 
the recusal of the trial judge, even if such requests had been made. Furthermore, the Petitioner 
offered nothing more than his own conclusory and bare allegations, unsupported by the record or 
affidavits. The petition submitted by Mr. Grant does not provide any basis for an objective 
evaluation regarding his counsel's decisions in relation to a change of venue or a change of 
judge. The Petitioner did not adequately support his argument that a fair and impartial trial could 
not be had in Bannock County, or offer any argument that the convenience of the parties and the 
witnesses would best be served by a change of the venue. Similarly, Mr. Grant did not 
adequately support his claims regarding the supposed bias of the judge. As such, the failure of 
the Petitioner's counsel to move for a change of venue and/or the recusal of the judge did not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel since those decisions was clearly a matter of trial 
strategy and tactical choice. In addition, the Petitioner did not present evidence adequate to 
satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, as Mr. Grant did not "draw a causal connection 
between the alleged deficiencies of his attorney's performance and his decision to plead guilty." 
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 677, 227 P.3d 925,931 (2010). Nowhere in his Response, did 
the Petitioner allege that had his counsel submitted a request for a change of venue and/or the 
recusal of the judge, that he would have pleaded not guilty. !d. As such, this Court finds these 
claims to be without merit. 
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2. Counsel did not pursue the option of Mental Health Court 
Mr. Grant next restates his argument that his counsel was ineffective in not pursuing the 
option of participation in the Mental Health Court. (Petitioner's Resp. at 3.) In particular, the 
Petitioner asserts he "request[ed] his public defender attempt to have this case be referred to the 
mental health court but as far as Grant can tell, no attempt was made." (/d.) However, beyond 
offering conclusory allegations regarding this contention, the Petitioner again failed to offer any 
admissible evidence in support of his argument that his counsel was ineffective in failing to have 
his case transferred to the Mental Health Court. Furthermore, "(w]here the alleged deficiency is 
counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been 
granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test. Id at 
158-59, 857 P.2d at 637-38." Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311, 318, 912 P.2d 679, 686 (Idaho 
Ct.App. 1996). Mr. Grant did make application to Drug Court, which application was denied. 
The Petitioner has submitted nothing to indicate his application for Mental Health Court would 
have been accepted. Furthermore, Mr. Grant has failed to illustrate through his Response 
sufficient facts to indicate that his counsel was deficient in this regard and he was thereby 
prejudiced. Additionally, Mr. Grant does not indicate his decision to plead guilty would have 
been different if his counsel had pursued the option of an alternative court. Furthermore, this 
Court was well aware of Mr. Grant's mental health history upon sentencing, and the outcome of 
his case would not have been affected had the Petitioner's attorney made application to the 
Mental Health Court. As such, this claim cannot result in the requested relief. 
Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
II 
3. Counsel was ineffective for failing to protect the Petitioner's interests 
during the psychological evaluation 
Mr. Grant next reasserts his claim that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
advise him of his rights in relation to a psychological evaluation. 
It is well-settled that a psychiatric evaluation, performed after the determination of guilt 
and for the express purpose of sentencing, is not a critical stage for Sixth Amendment purposes. 
Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448,462,224 P.3d 515, 529 (Idaho Ct.App. 2009). However, while 
"the majority of courts have held that a pretrial psychiatric examination is not a critical stage", a 
defendant is entitled to counsel regarding the decision to undergo the examination itself. !d. 
Thus, "a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding only the decision of 
whether to submit to a [psychiatric] exam." !d. at 455, 224 P.3d at 522. ("The Estrada and 
Estelle Courts took pains to distinguish the right to the advice of counsel regarding the 
examination process from a right to the presence of counsel during the examination process.") In 
discussing the duties of counsel in regard to a psychiatric evaluation, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
has further explained: "The advice of counsel during the decisional phase provides the defendant 
with information as to the examination process as well as the right to refuse examination to avoid 
self-incrimination. Thus armed, the defendant can adequately proceed through the examination." 
/d. at 456, 224 P.3d at 523. 
In this case, Mr. Grant specifically alleged his counsel did not inform him of his right to 
remain silent in regard to the psychological evaluation. Mr. Grant stated: "P.D. Dykeman 
should have informed Grant that the mental health examiner was not bound by patient/doctor 
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privilege and anything said by Grant could and, most likely, would be used against him by the 
state." (Petitioner's Response at 4.) Mr. Grant further asserted: "The P.D. never informed 
Grant that he was not even required to participate in the psych-eval. That Grant was not required 
to provide information against himself even if there was a court order in effect." (Jd.) However, 
Mr. Grant has presented no admissible evidence to demonstrate his counsel failed to advise him 
properly regarding his rights prior to his participation in the psychological examination. Instead, 
the Petitioner has only set forth unsubstantiated and unverified claims, which can provide no 
relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Furthermore, in his Guilty Plea 
Questionnaire, Mr. Grant clearly indicated he understood his rights, including his right to remain 
silent even after pleading guilty. Specifically, the Petitioner indicated he understood he had the 
right to "refuse to answer or provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment 
for the crime(s) to which" he was pleading guilty. (Guilty Plea Questionnaire Form, Idaho 
Criminal Rules Appendix A, April22, 2010, 2.) Mr. Grant further indicated he had "sufficient 
time to discuss" his case with his attorney. (!d. at 5.) Furthermore, to the extent the Petitioner 
claims his rights pursuant to Estrada v. State were violated, Mr. Grant indicated his attorney had 
advised him that he had "a constitutional right not to submit to a court ordered psychosexual 
evaluation for purposes of sentencing". (Id. at 6.) As such, his claim regarding ineffective 
assistance of counsel in this regard cannot stand. 
4. Failure of counsel to submit mitigating evidence 
Mr. Grant also reasserted the claim that his counsel failed to present mitigating evidence. 
(Petitioner's Response at 4.) The Petitioner set forth specific examples of such evidence and also 
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argued he was not given an opportunity to "state his side to rebut the prosecution's blown-out-of-
proportion description of the facts surrounding the incident Grant was involved in." (!d. at 5.) 
However, there was nothing submitted to this Court that identified any mitigating 
evidence that might have changed the outcome of these proceedings. See State v. Wood, 132 
Idaho 88, 97, 967 P.2d 702, 711 (1998) (Because the petitioner failed to submit anything to the 
court that "identifie[d] any mitigating evidence that might have changed the outcome of these 
proceedings", the petitioner failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel.). Furthermore, as 
indicated by his Guilty Plea Questionnaire, the Petitioner had no issues with his attorney and his 
handling of this case. For example, Mr. Grant answered, "no" to the question of whether there 
was anything he had requested his attorney to do that had not been done. (Guilty Plea 
Questionnaire Form at 5.) The Petitioner further stated he had reviewed the evidence in the case 
with his attorney. (!d.) By pleading guilty, Mr. Grant further willingly and knowingly waived 
his right to confront the witnesses against him, as well as the right to present witnesses and 
evidence in his defense. (!d. at 2.) Moreover, the Petitioner was provided an opportunity to 
make a statement and comments to this Court during sentencing. As such, the Petitioner has 
failed to substantiate this claim with the required evidence. 
5. Counsel did not explain the Petitioner's appeal rights 
Mr. Grant's again argues his counsel was inadequate by failing to explain his appeal 
rights. (Petitioner's Response at 5.) This Court previously addressed this claim in its Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss finding Mr. Grant failed to adequately support this allegation. In his Response, 
Mr. Grant has not offered this Court any additional or even pertinent information regarding this 
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claim. Mr. Grant recites his opinions regarding the legal duties of public defenders, but offers 
nothing admissible in support of his allegation that his counsel actually failed to advise him of 
his rights. The Petitioner did not submit any affidavits or supplementary documents or point to the 
record in support of this claim. Furthermore, in his Guilty Plea Questionnaire, Mr. Grant indicated 
he was not waiving his right to appeal the judgment of conviction and sentence. (Guilty Plea 
Questionnaire Form at 4.) 
Thus, Mr. Grant has once again only offered bare, conclusory and unverified allegations 
unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence. Thus, he has not proven his allegations by a 
preponderance of the evidence as required by the statutes governing post conviction proceedings, 
and this claim cannot merit the requested relief. See Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243 
P.3d 675, 678 (Idaho Ct.App. 2010). 
6. Counsel failed to protect the Petitioner's interests during the Pre-
Sentence Investigation 
Mr. Grant also reasserts his previous argument that his counsel failed to protect his rights 
during the pre-sentence investigation ("PSI"). (Petitioner's Response at 6.) The Petitioner 
further claims his "mental health issues" prevented him :from objecting to the PSI at the time of 
sentencing. (/d.) 
As explained in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
determined that counsel cannot provide ineffective assistance by failing to advise a client 
concerning his presentence investigation since a presentence interview is "not a critical stage of 
the adversarial proceedings .... " Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467,471, 180 P.3d 506,510 (Idaho 
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Ct.App. 2008). "' [I]f the stage is not critical, there can be no constitutional violation, no matter 
how deficient counsel's performance.' United States v. Ben/ian, 63 F .3d 824, 827 (9th Cir.l995); 
see Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 149 P.3d at 837." Hughes, 148 Idaho at 452,224 P.3d at 519. 
Furthermore, as explained in this Court's Notice, the defendant bears the burden of objecting to a 
PSI at the time of sentencing. Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428, 788 P.2d 243 (Idaho Ct.App. 
1990). Although the Petitioner now claims his "mental health issues" prevented him from objecting 
to the PSI, he does not support that allegation; rather, Mr. Grant merely sets forth unverified and 
conclusory allegations. This Court cannot grant a Petition for Post Conviction Relief on such bare 
claims. Therefore, Mr. Grant has not proven this allegation by a preponderance of the evidence 
as required by the statutes governing post conviction proceedings. 
7. Counsel should have recognized and accounted for the Petitioner's 
mental health issues 
Mr. Grant previously argued his counsel was ineffective in failing to recognize the 
Petitioner's mental health issues and addictive behaviors. In his Response, the Petitioner raises 
those same arguments and additionally explicitly states that he was incompetent when entering 
his plea. This Court already addressed these allegations in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 
including Mr. Grant's claim ofincompetence. 
"The standard to determine competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has 'the 
capacity to understand the proceedings against him and (2) assist in his defense."' Ridgley v. 
State, 148 Idaho 671, 678, 227 P.3d 925, 932(2010)(quoting Dusky v. US., 362 U.S. 402, 80 
S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)). 
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In order to find that petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for refusing to request a ... 
hearing on petitioner's competency to stand trial, petitioner must show that counsel was 
deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of petitioner's proceedings. In 
[Jeter, 41 7 S.E.2d at 596], this Court proclaimed that in proving Strickland prejudice 
within the context of counsel's failure to fully investigate the petitioner's mental 
capacity, "the [petitioner] need only show a 'reasonable probability' that he was ... 
incompetent at the time of the plea." 
!d. Thus, in a post conviction relief action, the petitioner has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent when he entered his guilty plea. 
/d.(intemal citations omitted). 
By his Response, Mr. Grant has once again not provided admissible evidence showing 
that there is a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the time he entered his plea. Mr. 
Grant offered nothing more than his own conclusory statements, as well as his own personal 
opinions. In fact, Mr. Grant admitted that he could only offer this Court "hearsay as he is not a 
mental health specialist." (Petitioner's Resp. at 7.) The Petitioner's own conclusory and bare 
\ 
assertions alone are not sufficient to survive summary dismissal. Mr. Grant's Response offers 
nothing more than a mere conclusion that he was not competent to understand the nature of the 
proceedings and knowingly enter into a guilty plea, and is also unsupported by any facts as to his 
alleged mental incompetency. Furthermore, in his Guilty Plea Questionnaire, Mr. Grant 
unequivocally indicated he was able ''to make a reasoned and informed decision" in his case. 
(Guilty Plea Questionnaire Form at 3.) He further stated he had not taken any medications or 
drugs, or consumed any alcoholic beverages that would affect his ability to make a reasoned and 
informed decision. (!d.) In addition, this Court was well aware of the Petitioner's mental health 
history, including his current diagnoses and the fact that he was taking prescription medications 
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for his mental health issues. Without something in the record suggesting that Mr. Grant was 
incompetent or that an examination would have shown that Mr. Grant was incompetent, there is 
nothing to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, and this claim must also fail. 
8. Counsel made false assurances regarding the plea agreement and 
possible sentence 
The Petitioner next re-argues the claim that he was given false assurances regarding his 
sentence. (See Petitioner's Response at 7.) 
This Court previously addressed this claim in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, finding Mr. 
Grant failed to adequately support this allegation. In his Response, Mr. Grant has not offered 
this Court any additional admissible information. The Petitioner did not submit any affidavits or 
supplementary documents or point to the record in support of this claim. Mr. Grant asserted: "As 
the State had requested the charges run concurrent and Grant's P.D. had said that the Judge assured 
him the sentences would run concurrent, Grant feels he was tricked into signing the plea agreement 
by his attorney." (Petitioner's Response at 8.) However, the Petitioner indicated he understood his 
plea agreement was "non-binding" and that the court "may impose any sentence authorized by law . 
. . . " (Guilty Plea Questionnaire Form at 4.) Mr. Grant specifically acknowledged: 
I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. This means that the 
court is not bound by the agreement or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose 
any sentence authorized by law, including the maximum sentence stated above. Because the 
court is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not to follow the 
agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw my guilty plea. 
(/d.) The Petitioner further indicated he understood that by pleading guilty to more than one crime, 
the "sentences for each crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently (at the same time) or 
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consecutively (one after the other)". (!d.) Moreover, the Petitioner has not satisfied the prejudice 
prong of Strickland by his arguments. The Idaho Court of Appeals has given the following 
pertinent explanation regarding counsel's role in the plea process: 
Where, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea 
upon the advice of counsel, "the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's 
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 
Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 373, 825 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct.App.l992). See also Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Soto, 121 
Idaho 53, 55, 822 P.2d 572, 574 (Ct.App.1991). When it is asserted that a guilty plea was 
the product of ineffective assistance, to prove the prejudice prong the defendant must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 
106 S.Ct. 366; Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376, 385 (2004). 
Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 884, 187 P.3d 1253, 1259 (Idaho Ct.App. 2008.) Mr. Grant did 
not "draw a causal connection between the alleged deficiencies of his attorney's performance 
and his decision to plead guilty." Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 677, 227 P.3d at 931. 
Therefore, based on the answers Mr. Grant provided in the Guilty Plea Questionnaire, as 
well as his failure to put forth admissible evidence, this Court finds the Petitioner's pleas were 
entered voluntarily and with full awareness of the possible consequences that might follow. Mr. 
Grant has not provided this Court with any indication that the entry of his guilty pleas was the 
result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, as Mr. Grant has only offered bare, conclusory 
and unverified allegations unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, he has not proven his 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence as required by the statutes governing post 
conviction proceedings, and this claim cannot merit the requested relief. 
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9. The Petitioner's efforts to fire his court-appointed attorney failed 
Mr. Grant next reasserted his allegation that post conviction relief is warranted because 
he asked this Court to assign him a new public defender, which request was denied. (See 
Petitioner's Response at 8.) 
As already stated by this Court in its Notice, the Petitioner makes no claim by this 
allegation that his counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency. In 
his Response, Mr. Grant offered no further documentation or admissible evidence regarding this 
allegation. Therefore, as already determined by this Court, this contention is not even oriented 
toward a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and is therefore not sufficient to support a 
petition for post conviction relief. 
10. Counsel failed to call certain witnesses 
Lastly, the Petitioner once again argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to call 
certain witnesses, including the victim in this matter and the private investigator hired by 
counsel. (Petitioner's Response at 8.) 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has set forth the following succinct explanation regarding the 
decision to call witnesses: 
It is well settled that the decision whether to call a particular witness is a strategic or 
tactical decision which will not be second-guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction 
relief under an alleged claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that decision is 
shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 775 
P.2d 1243 (Ct.App.l989); see also State v. McKenney, 101 Idaho 149, 609 P.2d 1140 
(1980), citing State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975). 
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Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254,258, 869 P.2d 571, 575 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994). 
The petition submitted by Mr. Grant does not provide any basis for an objective 
evaluation regarding his counsel's decision whether to call witnesses. Once again, the Petitioner 
has submitted conclusory statements and presented no admissible evidence to give rise to a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his counsel's performance fell outside the wide range 
of professional norms. Furthermore, as explained, the decision whether to call a particular 
witness is clearly a strategic or tactical one. Therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance in this 
regard also fails. 
c. The Petitioner did not adequately support his claims of ineffective assistance 
Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, Mr. Grant still failed to show how his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. First, Mr. Grant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance fell 
outside the wide range of professional norms, as he offered nothing more than conclusory 
statements. Mr. Grant did not support his allegations of ineffective assistance with proper 
documentation or argument. Secondly, even accepting the Petitioner's claim that his counsel 
was inadequate, the Petitioner still failed to demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no compelling 
argument that the outcome ofhis case would have been different but for his attorney's 
unprofessional errors. Therefore, Mr. Grant's allegation that his counsel was ineffective is no 
more than a conclusory allegation. "Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific 
facts, do not suffice to show ineffectiveness of counsel." Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 
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903. As such, the Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit, and 
his Petition for Post Conviction Relief cannot be granted on such basis. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as the reasoning set forth in the Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss, this Court hereby DISMISSES the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this lQ_ day ofMay, 2011. ~C.~ 
ROBERT C. NAFTZ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Copies to: 
Mark L. Hiedeman 
Woodrow Grant, IDOC No. 80692 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW GRANT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
AMEND PETITION FOR 
POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 
This case comes before this Court pursuant to a "Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief' filed by Woodrow Grant ("the Petitioner" or "Mr. Grant"). 
On March 17, 2011, pursuant to Idaho Code ("IC") § 19-4906 this Court issued a Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss ("Notice") Mr. Grant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief, indicating its intent to 
dismiss each of the claims raised in the Petition and providing Mr. Grant the 20 days required by 
statute to submit a suitable reply. On April4, 2011, the Petitioner submitted a Motion to Amend 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, along with the Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent 
to Dismiss. Thereafter, this Court issued an Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relie£ 
On May 5, 2011, the Petitioner submitted the subject motion seeking to amend his petition in order 
to cure any and all defects in the current petition and attempt to overcome this Court's 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss with a First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and 
First Affidavit of Facts in Support of First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
along with other pleadings to further the petitioner in defeating this Court's Notice of Intent 
to Dismiss. 
(Mot. for Leave to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, May 5, 2011, 2.) 
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DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) 1, a court may dismiss an application for post 
conviction relief sua sponte. However, "[w]hen a court dismisses an application sua sponte, the 
statute requires the court give the applicant 20-days' notice prior to the proposed dismissal." 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007). Thereafter, "[i]n light of the 
reply, or on default thereof, the court may ... grant leave to file an amended application or, direct 
that the proceedings otherwise continue." IDAHO CoDE ANN.§ 19-4906(b) (2010)(emphasis 
added). Thus, the decision whether to grant leave to amend an application for post conviction 
relief is a discretionary one. As such, this Court is not required to consider the issues presented 
by an amended petition, even if such amendment is filed prior to the district judge's dismissal. 
See Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 111, 15 P.3d 820, 824(2000). 
This Court properly notified the Petitioner of its intention to dismiss his pro se 
application for Post Conviction Relief for failing to set forth sufficient facts upon which relief 
could be granted. Pursuant to IC § 19-4906(b ), Mr. Grant had 20 days to reply to the proposed 
dismissal. Mr. Grant submitted a timely response, which included a motion to amend. By his 
reply, Mr. Grant did include new arguments not previously raised in his original Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief, which this Court reviewed and addressed. Mr. Grant has now submitted a 
I ' Idaho Code§ 19-4906 states, in part: 
(b) When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the applicant 
is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate 
to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an 
opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. In light of the reply, or on default thereof, the court 
may order the application dismissed or grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings 
otherwise continue. Disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there exists a material issue of fact. 
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second request to amend his petition. This request was received before this Court issued its 
Order dismissing the Petition for Post Conviction Relief, but well after the 20 days provided to 
Mr. Grant to submit a suitable reply. As this Court has now issued its Order Dismissing Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief, which addressed arguments not previously raised, this Court, in its 
discretion, sees no need for further amendment. Mr. Grant's second request to amend his 
petition, filed well after the expiration of his 20 days to respond, is no longer relevant. As such, 
this Court hereby DENIES the Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
This Court's recent dismissal of the Petition for Post Conviction Relief stands. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this~ day ofMay, 2011. ~c.~ 
Copies to: 
Mark L. Hiedeman 
Woodrow Grant, IDOC No. 80692 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW GRANT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND OR RECONSIDER 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case comes before this Court on a "Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider Order 
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief' filed by Woodrow Grant ("the Petitioner" or 
"Mr. Grant"). Mr. Grant is appealing this Court's dismissal of his Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief, which was issued on or about May 11, 2011. Pursuant to that dismissal, this Court denied 
the Petition for Post Conviction Relief on the grounds that Mr. Grant "did not raise any 
arguments not already addressed by this Court; nor did the Petitioner provide this Court with any 
new information." (Order Dismissing Pet. for Post Conviction Relief, May 11, 2011, 8.) Mr. 
Grant had made allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, which, after thorough 
review, this Court found to be frivolous. In addition to finding each of Mr. Grant's ten 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel to be without merit, this Court determined the 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief must also be denied because Mr. Grant's allegations were 
conclusory, in violation of the standards governing post conviction proceedings. (See id. at 21.) 
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By his current motion, Mr. Grant is moving this Court to "Alter or Amend or 
Reconsider" the Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief. He is bringing that 
motion pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59( e), 60(b), and ll(a)(2)(B). (See Mot. to 
Alter or Amend or Reconsider Order Dismissing Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief, May 27, 2011, 
("Mot. to Alter or Amend or Reconsider") 1.) According to Mr. Grant, he has submitted this 
motion to set "forth his claims [regarding ineffective assistance of counsel] in a more clearer 
fashion in order for this Court to properly reconsider its May 11, 2011, order and if so issue an 
order altering and amending said order, along with new additional facts." (!d. at 5.) 
After being fully briefed in the Petitioner's allegations and the law, and, after careful 
review of the Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider Order Dismissing Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, this Court hereby issues the following Order DENYING the Petitioner's 
motion. 
1. Whether to grant the Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"It is well established that an action under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is 
civil in nature and that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure [IRCP] are applicable in such a 
proceeding. State v. Goodrich, 104 Idaho 469, 660 P.2d 934 (1983). See also, Idaho Criminal 
Rule 57(b)." Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670,671, 115 P.3d 761 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005). "A motion 
to reconsider a dismissal order properly should be treated as a motion to alter or amend a 
judgment under I.R.C.P. 59(e) if the motion was timely filed. Hamilton v. Rybar. Ill Idaho 396, 
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724 P.2d 132 (1986)." !d. To be timely under that rule, a motion "must be filed within fourteen 
days after the entry of the 'judgment."' !d. However, if a motion 
for "reconsideration" raises new issues, or presents new information, not addressed to the 
court prior to the decision which resulted in the judgment, the proper analogy is to a 
motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b ). That rule requires a showing of good 
cause and specifies particular grounds upon which relief may be afforded. Hendrickson v. 
Sun Valley Corporation, Inc., 98 Idaho 133, 559 P.2d 749 (1977). As with Rule 59(e) 
proceedings, the right to grant, or deny, relief under the provisions of Rule 60(b) is a 
discretionary one with the trial court. Johnston v. Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414, 599 P.2d 985 
(1979). 
Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Idaho Ct.App. 1982.) In this case, Mr. 
Grant's motion would be considered timely under IRCP 59( e). Furthermore, as will be explained 
in greater detail below, Mr. Grant did not raise any new issues or present any new information 
not previously addressed by this Court prior to the decision which resulted in the judgment. 
Therefore, even though the Petitioner based his motion on several rules ofldaho civil procedure, 
including 59( e), 60(b), and ll(a)(2)(B), it is most proper for this Court to consider Mr. Grant's 
motion under Rule 59(e)1• 
"Rule 59 is a mechanism 'designed to allow the trial court either on its own initiative or 
on motion by the parties to correct errors both of fact and law that had occurred in its 
proceedings."' State v. Goodrich, 104 Idaho 469, 471, 660 P.2d 934, 936 (1983)(internal 
citation omitted). That rule ''thereby provides a mechanism for corrective action short of an 
1 Rule 59. New trial 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 
fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment. 
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appeal. Such proceedings must of necessity, therefore, be directed to the status ofthe case as it 
existed when the court rendered the decision upon which the judgment is based." Lowe, 103 
Idaho at 263, 646 P.2d at 1034 (internal citation omitted). With motions to alter or amend 
judgment, a party is not permitted to present new evidence. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 
472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 n.3 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006). "A Rule 59( e) motion to amend a judgment is 
addressed to the discretion of the court. Cohen v. Curtis Publishing Co., 333 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 
1964)." /d. As such, "[a]n order denying a motion made under Rule 59( e) to alter or amend a 
judgment is appealable, but only on the question of whether there has been a manifest abuse of 
discretion." /d.(intemal citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court must recognize the matter as 
discretionary, act within the outer boundaries of its discretion, and reach its conclusion through 
an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power, Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 
P.2d 993, 1 000(1990). 
DISCUSSION 
By his latest motion, the Petitioner has once again raised claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Mr. Grant asserts he is bringing this motion in order to set "forth new and additional 
facts in a more comprehensive presentation of both law and fact in order for this Court to 
reconsider its May 11, 2011, [order] for the legal conclusions reached were incorrect based upon 
relevant facts." (Mot. to Alter or Amend or Reconsider at 6.) However, Mr. Grant merely 
reasserts the same claims he has raised in his previous motions for post conviction relief. In 
particular, Mr. Grant again argues his counsel was ineffective in the following ways: 
a) Trial Counsel failed to disqualify Judge; 
Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider 
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(!d. at 6.) 
b) Trial Counsel failed to file motion for change of venue; 
c) Mr. Grant was denied Conflict-Free Counsel; 
d) Trial Counsel coerced Mr. Grant to plead guilty; 
e) Trial Counsel failed to have the Doctor who performed the Mental Health 
Evaluation at the sentencing hearing to offer mitigating evidence at the 
sentencing hearing; 
f) Trial Counsel failed to bring forth at sentencing a witness to offer 
mitigating testimony at the sentencing hearing. 
This Court has already addressed each of these claims in detail in both its Notice oflntent 
to Dismiss and its Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, finding such arguments 
to be conclusory and therefore insufficient to merit relief pursuant to the standards governing 
post conviction proceedings. By his Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider, Mr. Grant simply 
re-asserts these same claims of ineffective assistance, without presenting any compelling 
argument regarding alleged errors of fact or law committed by this Court in dismissing the 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Therefore, as Mr. Grant has not raised any new issues or 
presented any new information and has failed to sufficiently demonstrate that any error of fact or 
law has occurred, this Court must deny the Petitioner's motion. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court hereby DENIES the Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider Order 
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Even considering the so-called clarified facts 
and arguments included within the Petitioner's motion, Mr. Grant still did not make a sufficient 
showing that any error, either factual or legal, occurred in this Court's previous decision 
dismissing the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Based on the record in this case in its 
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entirety, the weight of the evidence favors this Court's dismissal. Therefore, the Petitioner's 
Motion to alter or amend the findings made by this Court under IRCP 59( e) cannot stand, and the 
Petitioner's Motion is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. ~ 
DATED this 3_ day of JU(y, 2011. 
Copies to: 
Mark L. Hiedeman 
Woodrow Grant, IDOC No. 80692 
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Defendant-Appellant 
IN TilE DISTRicT couRT oF THE :: 1 Xr# 
f? . : ~; 
--· : -~ .- J 
' ' .. 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF Tl IE STATE OF IDAI 10, IN AND FOR TilE COUNTY OF f}/fJVJI}cej<__ 
Peti toner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW, i,v~oJ row ~-r·a.nf 
Case No. Cit -,;u:ni·/S'"CJ-fC.. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL 
, Petitioner-Appellant in the 
above entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Defendant-Appellant's Motion 
for Appointment of Counsel tor the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in 
Support of Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 
I. Petitioner-Appellant is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of 
Corrections under the direct care, custody and control of Warden :Ye}u~t/ln,a :5;~.,-E4 
2. The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the Petitioner-
Appellant to properly pursue. Petitioner-Appellant lacks the knowledge and skill needed to 
represent him/herself. 
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3. Petitioner-Appellant required assistance completing these pleadings, as he/she 
was unable to do it him/herself. 
4. Othcr:J/qwe--~h lf;p<Jtt?fft'Lbtf t'£1/,Q.. 5iark /lfY'4Jkl~ l"vt61<'c P~~ck"'-
DATED this JL day of Se._? }e._,...\,< r , 20 I I . 
lt Jdcl rl(Cl t-J Cbro..r-.L 
Petitioner-Appellant 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss 
County of LIJ'-'J=,="''----- ) 
LtJ,=t,""-,,<:1""'J"'-~'-"ftJ=V.=J__..C-"-'-'rn...,&CL' +f ____ , after first being duly sworn upon his/her oath, deposes 
and says as follows: 
I. I am the Affiant in the above-entitled case; 
under the care, custody and control of Warden :FchtJ.q44 $,-,r·& 
3. I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire private counsel; 
4. I am without bank accounts, stocks, bonds, real estate or any other form of real 
property; 
5. I am unable to provide any other form of security; 
6. I am untrained in the law; 
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7. If I am forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be unfairly 
handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the State; 
Further your affiant saycth naught. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner-Appellant respectfully prays that this Honorable 
Court issue it's Order granting Petitioner-Appellant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel to 
represent his/her interest, or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may appear the 
Petitioner-Appellant is entitled to. 
() ~ \ 
DATED This _0_ day of __ .>..£_A?"'-+f>-}_._~"""'""'-'-"-"\,""-"-< ,_c ___ • 20_}_L_. 
Petitioner-Appellant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this 'J day 
of_~vb~ , 20 /I. 
N~M/ Commission expires: ~~ZI/'-f 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
HEREBY CERTIFY that on the B day of ).€' pl<! e"-b;: r, 20_l_t_, 
mailed a copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL for the purposes of filing \vith the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via 
prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
/J.r1111~ c: k County Prosecuting Attorney 
w-Ck) .J Cu'.J ~r O.J\\-: 
Petitioner-Appel iant 
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Full Name of Party Filing Document 
~~(J. l3~x 1¥ 
Mailing Address (Street or Post Office Box) 
s~ ;,~ 1 d!ut(J "83 1o2 
City, State and Zip Code 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE ~l.XT/1 JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF G/f/1//tl<'lck 
Case No. CV-;;u,ti-7S'l-fC 
vs. MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL 
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
Defendant.- f~f;f:<J/l~r-
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code§ 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for 
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility, 
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed 
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when 
you file this document. 
D Plaintiff 0i)etendant asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court fees, 
and swears under oath 
1. This is an action for (type of case) llffe«t( " P &.rf-C.'tf)nr/ le..f?oPz !2el.-1.e.f . I 
believe I am entitled to get what I am asking for. 
2. [tl111ave not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on 
the same operative facts in any state or federal court. D I have filed this claim against the 
same party or a claim based on the same operative facts in a state or federal court. 
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now. I have attached to this affidavit a current 
statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the 
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve ( 12) months, 
whichever is less. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
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4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the 
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly 
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the 
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's 
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full. 
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false 
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen (14) 
years. 
(Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages if more space is 
needed for any response.) 
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE: 
Name: t,J&t§drat,.J kNttt·l: Other name(s) I have used: _______ _ 
Address: f dJ ~ lioX 12::_. Jk, f.Jc 1/2 [{] /e; 7 
) 
How long at that address? ____________ Phone: _________ _ 
Year and place of birth: _________________________ _ 
DEPENDENTS: 
I am ~gle D married. If married, you must provide the following information: 
Name of spouse: ____________________________________________________ _ 
My other dependents including minor children (use only initials and age to identify children) are: __ _ 
INCOME: 
Amount of my income: $ ______ per D week D month 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
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Other than my inmate account I have outside money from: __ -"'&....;;"""'-----------
My spouse's income: $_---..:#"::o.<--- per D week D month. 
ASSETS: 
List all real property (land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you. 
Your 
Address City State 
Legal 
Description 
List all other property owned by you and state its value. 
Description (provide description for each item) 
Cash lnm,-tf62 Hw·l /lcccHA,I 
Value 
Notes and Receivables ___________________ _ 
Vehicles _________________________ _ 
Bank/Credit Union/Savings/Checking Accounts ___________ _ 
Stocks/Bonds/Investments/Certificates of Deposit. __________ _ 
Trust Funds _________________________________________ ___ 
Retirement Accounts/IRAs/401 (k)s. _______________ _ 
Cash Value Insurance ____________________ _ 
Motorcycles/Boats/RVs/Snowmobiles ______________ _ 
Furniture/Appliances ____________________ _ 
Jewelry/Antiques/Collectibles _________________ _ 
Description (provide description for each item) 
TVs/Stereos/Computers/Eiectronics _______________ _ 
Tools/Equipment ______________________ _ 
Sporting Goods/Guns ____________________ _ 
Horses/Livestock/Tack ____________________ _ 
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Other 
EXPENSES: (List all of your monthly expenses.) 
Expense 
Average 
Monthly Payment 
Rent/House Payment. ____________________ _ 
Vehicle Payment(s) ____________________ _ 
Credit Cards (List last four digits of each account number.) 
Loans (name of lender and reason for loan) 
Electricity/Natural Gas. ____________________ _ 
Water/Sewer/Trash _____________________ _ 
Phone_·~~~-----------------------------------------
Groceries Cemez~"ffdr// 
I 
Clothing. _________________________ _ 
Auto Fuel. _____________________________________ ___ 
Auto Maintenance _____________________ _ 
Cosmetics/Haircuts/Salons. __________________ _ 
Entertainment/Books/Magazines. _________________ _ 
Home Insurance __________________________________ __ 
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Expense 
Average 
Monthly Payment 
Auto Insurance. ______________________ _ 
Life Insurance. _______________________ _ 
Medical Insurance _____________________ _ 
Medical Expense ,pleJ./~cq ( cdl' -- CA.r/ 
7 
Other h6'j5<l / c:)~l') eJ <??- /IZa :./' .ez_:; 
MISCELLANEOUS: 
e:: 
~ 
~so() 
./· S.oo 
How much can you borrow? $ _ ___;"&;;.___ ____ From whom?----------
When did you file your last income tax return? aoo8 Amount of refund:$ Soo' CH..J 
PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided.) 
Name Address 
Eu:Jn.., G r OV'\\ Poc.p.,\ die; 1: c! 
> 
Typed/printed 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
' J ) ss. 
County of ,JL/l.l...t.a~,(::{~-----> 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me on this 
Phone 
~~0 .t...t t 3 t; 
Years Known 
d.(J 
:u. 
c:o· dayof ;?q~~t Z&t( 
~-
Notary Public fori Idaho 
Residing at IC!lW / 1 
Commission expires 8/J( '?L!l t( 
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- IDOC TRUST ======= OFFENDER BANK BAL~~CES 08/22/2011 
Doc No: 80692 Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL 
TIER-D CELL-94 
Transaction Dates: 08/01/2010-08/22/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
0.00 1608.96 1633.81 24.85 
================================ TRANSACTIONS ===============================~ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
08/03/2010 HQ0509116-001 950-REINCARCERATED IBSUSPCHK 
08/03/2010 HQ0509126-012 013-RCPT RDU RDU 
08/05/2010 HQ0509592-010 011-RCPT MO/CC RTCP MO 
08/09/2010 110510207-936 099-COMM SPL 
08/09/2010 110510207-937 099-COMM SPL 
08/16/2010 110510956-754 099-COMM SPL 
08/16/2010 110510956-755 099-COMM SPL 
08/16/2010 110511009-014 071-MED CO PAY 383325 
08/23/2010 110511745-724 099-COMM SPL 
J8/24/2010 HQ0511936-017 011 RCPT MO/CC RTCP MO 
08/25/2010 110512197 025 100-CR 1NM CMM 
J8/30/2010 II0512627-710 099-COMM SPL 
J8/30/2010 II0512627-711 099-COMM SPL 
08/31/2010 110512849-010 071-MED CO-PAY 397008 
09/03/2010 1C0513396-338 099-COMM SPL 
J9/23/2010 HQ0515727-018 011-RCPT MO/CC 289942 
09/28/2010 IC0516314-557 099-COMM SPL 
09/30/2010 HQ0516504-018 011-RCPT MO/CC 171930 
l0/01/2010 IC0516678-013 078-MET MAIL 114549 
10/05/2010 IC0516897-517 099-COMM SPL 
10/06/2010 IC0517382-020 078-MET MAIL 116152 
10/08/2010 HQ0517870-008 011-RCPT MO/CC 056586 
10/12/2010 IC0517927-561 099-COMM SPL 
10/13/2010 IC0518343-029 078-MET MAIL 115978 
10/19/2010 IC0518919-688 099-COMM SPL 
10/20/2010 HQ0519092-009 022-PHONE TIME 116547 
10/29/2010 HQ0520042-014 011-RCPT MO/CC 879315 
11/02/2010 IC0520360-526 099-COMM SPL 
_l/03/2010 IC0520671-012 078-MET MAIL 117188 
_1/04/2010 HQ0520724-017 011-RCPT MO/CC 521575 
11/09/2010 IC0521439-557 099 COMM SPL 
:1/15/2010 HQ0522095-016 011-RCPT MO/CC 076807 
'1/16/2010 IC0522179-646 099-COMM SPL 
1/16/2010 IC0522304-006 078-MET MAIL 117143 
~1/29/2010 HQ0523469 014 011-RCPT MO/CC 731067 
11/30/2010 IC0523588-011 070-PHOTO COPY 117142 
"2/07/2010 IC0524936-488 099-COMM SPL 
·2/10/2010 HQ0525483-003 011-RCPT MO/CC 741214 
:2/14/2010 IC0525877-493 099-COMM SPL 
0.00 
1.03 
50.00 
14.97DB 
12.13DB 
10.20DB 
5.59DB 
5.00DB 
1.86DB 
40.00 
1.86 
19.27DB 
6.80DB 
7.00DB 
10.00DB 
340.00 
85.75DB 
100.00 
0.17DB 
78.22DB 
1.73DB 
50.00 
22.30DB 
1.73DB 
280.23DB 
17.00DB 
25.01 
21.48DB 
2.75DB 
20.00 
21.79DB 
20.00 
17.88DB 
2.71DB 
50.00 
2.80DB 
36.59DB 
40.00 
36.59DB 
0.00 
1.03 
51.03 
36.06 
23.93 
13.73 
8.14 
3.14 
1.28 
41.28 
43.14 
23.87 
17.07 
10.07 
0.07 
310.87 
254.32 
354.32 
354.15 
275.93 
274.20 
324.20 
301.90 
300.17 
19.94 
2.94 
27.95 
6.47 
3.72 
23.72 
1.93 
21.93 
4.05 
1. 34 
51.34 
48.54 
11.95 
51.95 
15.36 
= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 08/22/2011 = 
Doc No: 80692 Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL 
TIER-D CELL-94 
Transaction Dates: 08/01/2010-08/22/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
0.00 1608.96 1633.81 24.85 
================================ TRANSACTIONS =================== ============ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
12/14/2010 IC0525914-493 099-COMM SPL 
12/14/2010 IC0525926-670 099-COMM SPL 
12/14/2010 IC0525974-022 078-MET MAIL 
12/17/2010 HQ0526491-008 011-RCPT MO/CC 
12/20/2010 IC0526734-012 078-MET MAIL 
12/21/2010 HQ0526858-009 011-RCPT MO/CC 
12/23/2010 IC0527219-495 099-COMM SPL 
12/28/2010 HQ0527590-011 011-RCPT MO/CC 
01/04/2011 IC0528324-630 099-COMM SPL 
01/07/2011 IC0529034-029 078-MET MAIL 
01/10/2011 HQ0529142-011 011-RCPT MO/CC 
Ol/11/2011 IC0529332-582 099-COMM SPL 
01/18/2011 IC0529982-599 099 COMM SPL 
01/18/2011 IC0529984-027 100-CR INM CMM 
01/24/2011 IC0530741-027 078-MET MAIL 
0 1 / 2 5 / 2 0 11 I C 0 5 3 0 8 16 - 5 8 2 0 9 9 - COMriJ S PL 
01/27/2011 HQ0531291-016 061-CK INMATE 
01/31/2011 IC0531529-029 078-MET MAIL 
02/01/2011 IC0531587-567 099-COMM SPL 
02/03/2011 HQ0532078-014 011-RCPT MO/CC 
02/08/2011 IC0532636-528 099-COMM SPL 
02/08/2011 HQ0532829-012 022-PHONE TIME 
02/11/2011 IC0533232-022 078-MET MAIL 
02/11/2011 IC0533236-007 070-PHOTO COPY 
02/14/2011 HQ0533255-024 011-RCPT MO/CC 
02/15/2011 IC0533363-658 099-COMM SPL 
02/15/2011 HQ0533511-001 961-FIX BATCH 5332 
02/22/2011 IC0533968-513 099 COMM SPL 
02/22/2011 HQ0534057-023 022-PHONE TIME 
03/01/2011 IC0534891-502 099-COMM SPL 
03/02/2011 HQ0535040-019 011-RCPT MO/CC 
03/08/2011 IC0535797-507 099-COMM SPL 
03/09/2011 HQ0536018-002 022-PHONE TIME 
03/15/2011 IC0536585-626 099-COMM SPL 
J3/18/2011 HQ0537060-024 011-RCPT MO/CC 
03/21/2011 IC0537237-019 078-MET MAIL 
03/21/2011 IC0537238-016 078-MET MAIL 
03/22/2011 IC0537335-568 099-COMM SPL 
J3/29/2011 HQ0538044-014 011-RCPT MO/CC 
122490 
845087 
121218 
843423 
182745 
127823 
640902 
132982 
K-133158 
132091 
317879 
131224 
132410 
132413 
632904 
FIX BATCH 
121184 
732821 
133985 
249807 
133872 
135556 
551287 
-36.59DB 
44.21DB 
4.85DB 
20.00 
6.16DB 
50.00 
48.07DB 
50.00 
54.13DB 
1.05DB 
30.00 
6.00DB 
26.48DB 
54.13 
2.75DB 
42.29DB 
9.25DB 
2.07DB 
7.00DB 
40.00 
31.26DB 
6.80DB 
2.34DB 
4.30DB 
10.00 
6.37DB 
20.00 
14.97DB 
3.40DB 
1. SODB 
50.00 
26.97DB 
3.40DB 
19.50DB 
30.00 
1.90DB 
5.08DB 
14.01DB 
100.00 
51.95 
7.74 
2.89 
22.89 
16.73 
66.73 
18.66 
68.66 
14.53 
13.48 
43.48 
37.48 
11.00 
65.13 
62.38 
20.09 
10.84 
8.77 
1.77 
41.77 
10.51 
3.71 
1. 37 
2.93DB 
7.07 
0.70 
20.70 
5.73 
2.33 
0.83 
50.83 
23.86 
20.46 
0.96 
30.96 
29.06 
23.98 
9.97 
109.97 
= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 08/22/2011 = 
Doc No: 80692 Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL 
TIER-D CELL-94 
Transaction Dates: 08/01/2010-08/22/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
0.00 1608.96 1633.81 24.85 
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
Date Batch Description 
03/31/2011 HQ0538385 006 061-CK INMATE 
03/31/2011 HQ0538452-271 970 533048 VOIDED 
03/31/2011 IC0538464-006 045-ICE CREAM 
04/01/2011 II0538723-001 072-METER MAIL 
04/04/2011 II0538945-772 099-COMM SPL 
04/05/2011 HQ0539138-012 013-RCPT RDU 
04/05/2011 II0539254-011 100-CR INM CMM 
04/11/2011 II0539825-005 072-METER MAIL 
04/11/2011 II0539869-922 099-COMM SPL 
04/11/2011 II0539869-923 099-COMM SPL 
04/13/2011 II0540340-001 071-MED CO-PAY 
04/13/2011 HQ0540350-001 012-RCPT CHECK 
04/14/2011 HQ0540414-012 011-RCPT MO/CC 
04/14/2011 II0540474-018 071-MED CO-PAY 
04/18/2011 II0540794-771 099-COMM SPL 
04/18/2011 II0540794-772 099-COMM SPL 
04/20/2011 II0541121-021 070-PHOTO COPY 
04/25/2011 !!0541477 690 099-COMM SPL 
05/02/2011 II0542157-658 099-COMM SPL 
05/03/2011 II0542374-001 072-METER MAIL 
05/09/2011 HQ0543305-001 011-RCPT MO/CC 
05/09/2011 II0543339-885 099-COMM SPL 
05/11/2011 II0543756-012 070-PHOTO COPY 
05/13/2011 HQ0543978-019 011-RCPT MO/CC 
05/16/2011 II0544142-685 099-COMM SPL 
05/23/2011 II0544833-664 099-COMM SPL 
05/25/2011 II0545099-001 072-METER MAIL 
05/31/2011 II0545534-014 072-METER MAIL 
05/31/2011 II0545649-017 070-PHOTO COPY 
06/02/2011 HQ0546011-021 011-RCPT MO/CC 
06/03/2011 II0546150-018 223-MAY PAY PENDYN 
06/06/2011 II0546413-797 099-COMM SPL 
06/09/2011 HQ0547041-008 011-RCPT MO/CC 
06/10/2011 II0547221-013 072-METER MAIL 
06/13/2011 II0547382-819 099-COMM SPL 
06/15/2011 HQ0547655-020 011-RCPT MO/CC 
06/16/2011 II0547779-005 072-METER MAIL 
06/27/2011 II0548847-665 099-COMM SPL 
06/30/2011 HQ0549364-008 011-RCPT MO/CC 
Ref Doc 
J-135650 
6 
J-135650 
184389 
POWER 
171265 
446247 
ICE CREAM 
RCPT MO 
446233 
184390 
189707 
RTCP MO 
189706 
RTCP MO 
187116 
174315 
187117 
RTCP MO 
PENDYNE 
RTCP MO 
184049 
RTCP MO 
184051 
RCPT MO 
Amount 
4.25DB 
-4.25DB 
4.25DB 
2.27DB 
13.10DB 
0.53 
13.10 
2.75DB 
19.12DB 
31.39DB 
3.00DB 
4.25 
20.00 
11.00DB 
17.00DB 
26. 30DB 
2.45DB 
10.07DB 
1.64DB 
0.88DB 
20.00 
2.27DB 
1.00DB 
20.00 
29.32DB 
8.64DB 
3.36DB 
0.44DB 
4.70DB 
40.00 
12.00 
40.08DB 
20.00 
2.22DB 
22.51DB 
5.00 
1.71DB 
2.55DB 
10.00 
Balance 
105.72 
109.97 
105.72 
103.45 
90.35 
90.88 
103.98 
101.23 
82.11 
50.72 
47.72 
51.97 
71.97 
60.97 
43.97 
17.67 
15.22 
5.15 
3.51 
2.63 
22.63 
20.36 
19.36 
39.36 
10.04 
1.40 
1.96DB 
2.40DB 
7.10DB 
32.90 
44.90 
4.82 
24.82 
22.60 
0.09 
5.09 
3.38 
0.83 
10.83 
= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 08/22/2011 = 
Doc No: 80692 Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL 
TIER-D CELL-94 
Transaction Dates: 08/01/2010-08/22/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
0.00 1608.96 1633.81 24.85 
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
06/30/2011 HQ0549364-009 
07/01/2011 II0549535-012 
07/05/2011 II0549742-773 
07/07/2011 HQ0550057-001 
07/12/2011 HQ0550774-002 
07/18/2011 II0551322-808 
07/18/2011 II0551322-809 
07/19/2011 HQ0551470-006 
07/21/2011 II0551816-014 
07/21/2011 II0551817-003 
07/25/2011 II0552021-701 
08/01/2011 HQ0552722-012 
08/03/2011 II0552971-005 
08/05/2011 II0553412-009 
08/05/2011 1!0553495-012 
08/08/2011 II0553691-879 
08/08/2011 II0553691-880 
08/08/2011 HQ0553711-019 
08/10/2011 II0554027-006 
08/10/2011 HQ0554071-015 
08/15/2011 II0554512-771 
08/18/2011 HQ0554991-004 
08/22/2011 II0555193 001 
011-RCPT MO/CC RCPT MO 
223-JUN PAY PENDYN PENDYNE 
099-COMM SPL 
960-FIX BATCH 5493 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
072-METER MAIL 
072 METER MAIL 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
072-METER MAIL 
072-METER MAIL 
211-JUL PAY PENDYN 
099-COMl\1 SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
072-METER MAIL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
072-METER MAIL 
134 
FIX 549364 
RTCP MO 
RCPT MO 
194382 
194381 
RCPT MO 
194407 
80692 
PENDYNE 
RCPT MO 
194461 
RCPT MO 
RCPT MO 
194462 
100.00 
30.00 
40.40DB 
100.00DB 
25.00 
13.25DB 
10.82DB 
20.00 
1.71DB 
1.71DB 
17.33DB 
15.00 
3.41DB 
1.71DB 
31.90 
3.71DB 
31.96DB 
30.00 
1.71DB 
5.00 
33.45DB 
20.00 
1.71DB 
110.83 
140.83 
100.43 
0.43 
25.43 
12.18 
1.36 
21.36 
19.65 
17.94 
0.61 
15.61 
12.20 
10.49 
42.39 
38.68 
6.72 
36.72 
35.01 
40.01 
6.56 
26.56 
24.85 
IN THE DISTRicr COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRicr OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW GRANT, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent-Respondent on Appeal, 
) 
) 
) Supreme Court No. 
) 
) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
) OF 
) APPEAL 
) 
) 
________________________) 
Appealed from: Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County 
Honorable Judge Robert C. Naftz presiding 
Bannock County Case No: CV-2011-759-PC 
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief field the 11th day of May, 2011 and Order Denying Motion to Alter or 
Amend or Reconsider Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
Attorney for Appellant: Woodrow Grant, pro se, Boise, Idaho 
Attorney for Respondent: Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise 
Appealed by: Woodrow Grant 
Appealed against: State of Idaho 
Notice of Appeal filed: September 21, 2011 
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: No 
Appellate fee paid: No, exempt 
Request for additional records filed: No 
135 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: 
Name of Reporter: Stephanie Davis 
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? Yes from the Underlying 
Criminal Cases CR-2009-19451-FE and CR-2009-19445-FE. 
Estimated Number of Pages: More than 100 
Dated~-\ V\'\~ LL..., 2o \\ 
DALE HATCH, 
Clerk of the Distr~i ~loY.(._ I. 
I nmat~o: name lvoocl cqf&J~t:i/-
1 LJ()C N(). ~~91.. ~L_i,h_i.f_:iJ 
Address L~--'l;:;l'-._1"(_~--------· 
Pn: /:fl2;,- / tfg/u) f:5 :;.t?7C7 
IN TilE DISTRICT COURT OF TilL-~ '51,15_:r_IL__~----· JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TIIF STATE OF ID!\110. IN AND FOR TilE COUNTY OF B/INN~ e.J;:_ 
t, ... :·6{;}2t'!or:;. {; R!l~L------~· ) 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant. ) 
) 
VS. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO. ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No. t!..l./ -,l." /1-?s·q -I'<: 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT 
OF COUNSEL 
IT IS IIEARBY ORDERED that the Petitioner-Appellant's Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel is granted and lh.e 614 f<-. ~1/;._fe_ f, tJ. (attorney's 
name). a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to represent 
said defendant in all proceedings involving this appeal. 
DATED thi~~ day of __ _2~t~" \, (; .20_l_t. 
ORDLR GR:\NTIN(I 1\IOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
H\'\ l't'il 1 !> i 7 I)~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW JOHN GRANT, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 39207-2011 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant -Appellant. 
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound 
under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
(Seal) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW JOHN GRANT, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 39207-2011 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant -Appellant. 
I, DALE HATCH, the duly elected, qualified and acting Clerk of the District 
Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Bannock, do hereby certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification 
and introduced into evidence at trial. The following exhibit will be treated as a 
exhibit in the above and foregoing cause, to wit: 
1. Presentence Report from CR-2009-19451-FE and CR-2009-19445-FE. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
(Seal) 
~~/,,,~' ~~ '> 
DALE HATCH1 of the District Court /~~annock M>4btv, State of Idaho 
\ \,"'", \··-~-~~IL7;~"--, "',",0-B¢::.~~<~, 
Depu ~~crefk, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WOODROW JOHN GRANT, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 39207-2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I 
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the 
CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Molly Huskey 
Appellate Public Defender 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0005 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this __ 
(Seal) 
DALE HATCH, 
Cletk~of;the District Court 
r--~~B~(l~ pount):~ Idaho Supreme Court 
~~_:~5r~"~,~~~;::::2\'~"'::::::::"~\::::::::::::::::=::::::::::~::::::::.::::::::__ 
Deput:y~oem-,~~---
